James Nixey : «Armenia’s democratic health is particularly poor right now»

03/07/2012

Interview with James Nixey the Programme Manager and Research Fellow on the Russia and Eurasia Programme at British research centre “Chatham House” (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) in London, (expert of Russia’s foreign policy, South Caucasus and Central Asian foreign policy)

– Mr. Nixey, you called your last report “The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia”, are you really assured that Russia is loosing his Influence in the region of South Caucasus and particularly in Armenia?

– Yes, “The Long Goodbye” means that Russia is leaving but it’s taking a long time. That’s the first aspect. I think that, if we see the generational change in this countries, the Russian influence, the Russian domination, the Russian idea and concept is slowly leaving the South Caucasus and Central Asia. But Armenia is more an exception in the rule, and the reason of it is that in Armenia, more than any other country in the former Soviet space, Russia exerts enormous degree of contoll because of its ability to buy up state infrastructure, state resources and even some politicians as well. And It’s extraordinary, because you don’t share a border, it’s quite astonishing. It would be easier, if you shared a border, but the geographical aspect isn’t going to be important. What is really important is the financial aspect and the connection between the financial aspect and the political aspect afterwards.

– So you mean that Armenia has an economical dependence from Russia?

-Yes, exactly!

– And is it now strong or weak?

– It’s strong and getting stronger. Who has the railways, who has the airlines, who has the national mining company, who has the telecommunicational industry etc.? The answer to all this questions is basicly Russia or partly Russia or majority share Russia. The Armenian economy was in a serious trouble some 7-8 years ago and, of course, Armenia needed the money, so when all of this assets were put up to fail, Russia simply did than anybody else, he willed to pay more, so the Armenian Republic accepted the higher speeder and the higher speeder was Russia.

– Does Armenia need to become free from that economical dependence from Russia?

– I think that it would be desirable to become free from that dependence but it will be very difficult to do. Armenia doesn’t have money to buy Russia out, Armenian economy is about 60 times small then Russian, so it’s not possible to undo what has been done. It’s almost impossible if we especially take into account the current financial situation in Russia, in Armenia and the global financial situation. But on the other hand it’s not like Abkhazia or South Osetia, where the only money comes from Russia.

– But Armenia gets financial help from the West too, doesn’t he?

-The European Union puts in almost nothing because it doesn’t really fund the South Caucasus except of through a couple of mechanisms such the “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP). Armenia does get help from the United States partly but mostly it comes from Armenian diaspora community, and the money coming from USA to Armenia has to be equalized with the support to Azerbaijan.

– Let’s turn from economical aspect to the political aspect which has no less importance! In your report you wrote that “Robert Kocharian, Armenia’s president from 1998 to 2008, effectively sold off Armenia to Chubais and other Russian commercial and political interests (means to Russia, -A.S.)” , and then – “Kocharian’s successor, (the present president,- A.S.) Serzh Sargsyan, is ostensibly less pro-Russian but by the time of his election in 2008 much of his country had already been sold.” What makes Serzh Sargsyan less pro-Russian?

– It’s very simple. The fact of matter is that the economic situation in Armenia under Kocharian was worse, and he had to sell it off (through Gazprom’s ownership of its Armenian subsidiary, ArmRosGazprom, 80% of Armenia’s energy structure is Russian-controlled, including the majority of the Iran–Armenia gas pipeline, Russia has also bought up all but two of Armenia’s hydroelectric and nuclear power stations, in exchange for writing off Armenian debt etc.,- A.S.). Kocharian always had more Russian sympathies than Sargsyan. However Mr. Sargsyan has been left to pick up the pieces, as all presidents always have to deal with the ramifications from previous presidents and he has to deal with the fact that Mr. Kocharian did what he did. But the real question here is that to what extent this financial acquisition gave Russia political leverage? And there’s no exact answer to that except of saying that it must give him some, and there are a few specific examples, when some politicians in Armenia who have come under the pay of The Kremlin and have to do the Kremlin’s business. So I think that this political influence is the result of the economic influence, and it requires quite substantial research in order to find out the direct link between this two things, and that research have been done by me. There is a link between the financial inputs and the politically desirable outcomes for Russia.

– Why I am asking this question, because it seems that Russia’s influence still remains strong in Armenia under the presidency of Serzh Sargsyan, as it was in the period of Robert Kocharian (Armenia still has energy dependence from Russia, Russian Gazprom controls even the price of the gas coming from Iran, “Russian railways” bought the concession on building of Iran-Armenia railways after Mr. Sargsyan became the president, etc.). That’s why it’s very interesting why you describe president as “less pro-Russian”? Maybe in Europe he’s accepted as more pro-Western figure?

– I don’t think that people in Europe think about Mr. Sargsyan as more pro-Western president, just because he is less pro-Russian. They think more about the Georgian presidents and the Russian presidents: The Georgian president is currently pro-Western and the Russian president is of course not pro-Western.

– Does president Sargsyan want to have closer relations with the West ?

– I think yes, but only in order to support Armenian policy priorities. He wants better relations with the West because he needs the West’s support in Turkish-Armenian relations and because he wants the West to support over Armenia’s position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Only in that sense president Sargsyan can be pro-Western. He is not pro-Western in the sense he wants to join, for example, the NATO or other organizations. But he believes particularly that Armenia should be engaged in improving the level of Armenia’s democracy, especially when you look at the reasonably pooly held parliamentary elections last month which seem to indicate that Mr. Sargsyan will certainly be elected as a president again next year.

– And what do u think, wha ist the reason that the West’s treatment became so warm toward president Sargsyan’s administration, if we remember, for example, that the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s, during her visit to Armenia, described Armenian President as “an excellent leader”, or Clinton’s high rating of the last parliamentary elections, and before that the high and enthusiastic rating to the same elections by many European observers. Maybe there’s a link between all these?

– I certainly don’t agree that European monitoring systems on the parliamentary elections rated them as free and fairly held at all, that was not the result given. I think if the Secretary Hillary Clinton says something like that than that is exactly what Sectretaries of State must do when they are guests in any country. But in fact the Armenia’s democratic health is particularly poor right now, and America doesn’t really care about that. America has more important concerns, he has a real upset about USA-Russia relations. And I don’t think that America is really concerned about democratic development in Armenia.

– Then can we describe these rates as political messages?

– Yes, that’s right. I agree with this. I have to say that the European Union gives mixed political messages. It does have democratic rhetoric, It does believe in ratcheting up its absolute pressure. And I think the West can certainly be blamed for not being consistent in his messages. But the truth is that the West pays more attention to Georgia, because it has more louder geopolitical voice and to Azerbaijan because it has energy and is relatively wealthy compared to Armenia. And in this sense, frankly speaking, Armenia gets more ignored, unfortunately.

– And can this external factors affect on the internal political situation of Armenia, especially if we take into account the upcoming presidential elections next year?

– Yes, I think we have to worry about this, because Armenia has a history of street protests, of post-election protests, then I think that the claims on the election results, the perception of the politicians, the economic situation of the country means that we need to be very concerned about ths stability of the country after the presidential elections because we remember, that a dozen of people were killed during the last presidential elections in Armenia. Then I think that it can put under risk the stability of the county especially if we watch this in the context of wide world, which is having periodic revolutions. And yes, the external factors can affect badly on the political situation of Armenia.

– Let’s talk a little about Nagorno Karabakh conflict at the end! Do you consider possible the reconciliation of Karabakh conflict in the near future?

– No, I’m afraid that it’s not possible in the near future. It seems highly unlikely to me even that Mr. Sargsyan or Mr. Aliev possess the political will that would be needed to come to some form of compromise. A compromise might look, roughly speaking, like Armenia retains Nagorno-Karabakh but gives away the teritories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh but that sort of compromise insn’t on the table right now. I think at the moment the fact of the matter is that Armenia is in a position in Nagorno-Karabakh effectively and that benefits Armenia. So I don’t see at all that we have a situation whereby the resolution is even remotely close for the reconciliation.

Aram SARGSYAN