A cable published by Wikileaks contains the letter of former US Ambassador to Armenia Marie Yovanovich, which was sent to the States on November 7, 2008, and contains the first president’s and his ANC’s movement activities. The tile of the cable was the following: LTP URGES U.S. TO TAKE INITIATIVE ON NK CONFLICT . Below is the full text of the cable:
(C) During the Ambassador’s introductory call on Levon Ter-Petrossian, the ex-president and opposition leader declared the time was ripe for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and urged the U.S. to step in decisively to seal the deal. Ter-Petrossian pledged not to hinder President Sargsian’s peace efforts, and said a breakthrough on Nagorno-Karabakh would also result in Armenia’s rapprochement with Turkey. Ter-Petrossian defended his fiery October 17 speech as a tactic to mollify radical elements in his opposition movement, but warned he would resume mass protests in several months if Sargsian made no progress in his peace efforts. While encouraging Ter-Petrossian’s support of Sargsian’s peace initiatives, the Ambassador told LTP she could not accept his false public caricatures of the U.S. to score political points against Sargsian. END SUMMARY.
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U.S. SHOULD SEIZE MOMENT TO SOLVE NK CONFLICT
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2. (C) On November 4, Ambassador Yovanovitch paid an introductory visit to Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrossian (LTP), which LTP hosted at his residence in downtown Yerevan. His senior advisers David Shahnazarian, Levon Zurabian, and Avetis Avakian also participated in the meeting. (NOTE: The meeting was originally scheduled for October 20, but the Ambassador postponed it to convey displeasure with LTP’s pointed October 17 rally speech in which he accused the United States of giving President Sargsian a pass on democracy issues in exchange for excessive Armenian concessions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Turkish-Armenian relations. END NOTE.)
3. (C) LTP declared that the time to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict was now, and that the U.S. should seize the unique moment of thawing relations in the South Caucasus to resolve the conflict before the next U.S. presidential administration comes to power. LTP stated that conditions were ripe for a settlement and decisive U.S. involvement could get the parties there. These conditions include the fact that both Azerbaijan and Turkey have more confidence in the U.S. than Russia; that Armenia’s president Serzh Sargsian increasingly favors U.S. mediation on NK because of what LTP asserted were Sargsian’s "serious, personal disagreements" with Russia; and that the November 2 Moscow declaration by Presidents Medvedev, Aliyev, and Sargsian has now formalized Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s presidents’ acceptance of the Madrid Principles as the basis of a resolution, and the sidelining of NK’s leaders as a party to the negotiations.
4. (C) LTP argued that the Moscow declaration signifies the beginning of the final stretch of the negotiating process, and that "it is now time for the U.S. to step in." LTP recommended that the U.S. facilitate the final negotiations by a) increasing the authority of the Minsk Group negotiators by making its co-chairs more senior, and getting its negotiators to take a tougher line with both parties; b) dispatching Secretary Rice to the region to negotiate a final agreement; and c) having President Bush host Presidents Sargsian and Aliyev at a signing ceremony before he leaves office. LTP said the U.S. would be doing Armenia and its people a great favor by intervening to achieve a balanced settlement that would leave neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan with "a loser’s complex."
5. (C) The Ambassador agreed with LTP that the time for a solution to the NK conflict was now, that the U.S. is very active behind the scenes, and said there is strong desire in Washington to achieve a breakthrough. She agreed with LTP that the happy consequences of the unhappy Russia-Georgian war in July is a change in Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents’ mindsets, and that this needed to be taken advantage of. She took strong exception, however, to LTP’s October 17 speech in which he had argued in the most provocative terms the exact opposite of what he was now saying to the Ambassador privately, and had called the United States "doubly immoral" for allegedly taking unfair advantage of Serzh Sargsian’s supposed political weakness to push for a deal counter to Armenia,s national interests. The Ambassador promised to relay LTP’s suggestions to Washington, and said Washington was interested in facilitating a settlement.
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LTP PLEDGES SUPPORT FOR NK EFFORTS
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6. (C) LTP said he understood the complicated predicaments that Sargsian and Aliyev currently find themselves in, and acknowledged that Armenian society will have a hard time perceiving any settlement in a positive light. That said, LTP assured the Ambassador that his opposition movement will not do anything to complicate Sargsian’s settlement efforts. This is one of the reasons, LTP said, that he announced a temporary stop to his protest rallies during his October 17 rally. He warned, however, that if Armenia’s authorities do not reach a settlement by February, he will resume his protest activities against Sargsian.
7. (C) The Ambassador responded that the United States appreciated anything LTP could do to support the Armenian authorities’ on resolving the NK conflict. She added that while it was normal that Armenia and "authorities" in Nagorno-Karabakh will seek to protect their interests in a settlement, they will also need to show flexibility to reach a resolution that will provide for a lasting peace. She said while the U.S. has high hopes for progress on NK and Turkey, it will require real courage and leadership, particularly in Armenia and Azerbaijan, to achieve some breakthroughs. In this respect, the Ambassador said it was incumbent on opposition parties in both countries to support their authorities’ efforts to reach a settlement.
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TURKEY-ARMENIA RELATIONS DEPEND ON NK SETTLEMENT
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8. (C) LTP told the Ambassador that the Russia-Georgia war was not only a "cold shower" for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also a positive catalyst for improving Armenian-Turkish relations. He said the resolution of the NK conflict would be the key to normalizing relations between Yerevan and Ankara, and that the genocide issue would not be a stumbling block. LTP said Armenia and Turkey could easily get around the historical commission issue by "disagreeing on it, putting it aside, and dealing with other issues" first. He argued that while genocide recognition was a priority for the Armenian Diaspora, it was not one for Armenians living in Armenia. LTP said he remained convinced of his one-package approach: that Armenia should simultaneously solve the NK conflict and normalize relations with Turkey. The Ambassador agreed with LTP that a breakthrough in normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations was possible, and that it appeared Turkey was truly serious about moving forward with Armenia. The Ambassador stated that an open border between Turkey and Armenia would transform the South Caucasus.
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LTP DEFENDS HIS LAST SPEECH
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9. (C) LTP defended his pointed October 17 speech in which he announced a suspension of his protests because he did not want the West — the United States and Turkey — to exploit Sargsian’s disputed legitimacy to pry undue concessions from Armenia on NK (reftels). LTP assured the Ambassador that his rhetoric was meant only to mollify the radical elements in his opposition movement — to provide them with a viable explanation for his decision to suspend protest activities. LTP said he "had no other way to get people off the streets and back in their homes."
10. (C) LTP said he even deserved credit for giving Armenia’s authorities time to focus on an NK settlement, thereby preventing more radical elements in Armenia’s political landscape from exploiting the situation at such a critical moment. The Ambassador replied that the problem with such rhetoric — even if it is meant to satisfy LTP’s constituents — is that the U.S. has no way of knowing what LTP truly thinks, and that painting the United States in an immoral light on resolving NK is intellectually dishonest no matter the motive. The Ambassador stated that if LTP expected the U.S. to be level with him in the future, the U.S. government expected the same from him.
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AUTHORITIES TOUGHER ON POLITICAL DETAINEES
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11. (C) LTP told the Ambassador that President Sargsian has taken a much tougher stance on the issue of political detainees since August. He said his only explanation was that Sargsian has gotten a green light on this issue from the international community. He cryptically warned that if the authorities did not change their approach, obstacles would get in the way of "other processes." (COMMENT: LTP was likely making a linkage of the issue with the settlement of the NK conflict and Armenia-Turkey rapprochement. END COMMENT.)
LTP asserted that he and the Armenian National Congress were under great pressure by families of the detained to engage in more radical protest actions, and that his announcement of a pause involved "great risks" for him. LTP reiterated that absent any movement from the authorities on NK in the next several months, he would be obliged to resume "mass protests."
12. (C) The Ambassador disagreed with LTP’s charge that the U.S. was giving Sargsian a free pass on the detainees and democracy issues in exchange for flexibility on the NK conflict and rapprochement with Turkey. She told LTP that democracy and human rights issues remained a top U.S. priority in Armenia, noting that she had raised these issues repeatedly, both in public and in private, with the authorities. The Ambassador emphasized that the release of the detainees was critical for two reasons: reconciling Armenia’s tense internal situation; and repairing Armenia’s greatly damaged international reputation after the March 1 unrest.
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COMMENT
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13. (C) Our sense is that LTP is being disingenuous in suggesting that his dishonest rhetoric and maneuverings were aimed at getting opposition protesters off the streets so as to create more maneuvering room for the Armenian government to negotiate the best possible deal on NK and Turkey. Our read is that LTP saw support for public rallies dwindling with each passing month, and was desperate to find a face-saving tactic. Empty-handed after months of a stridently rejectionist strategy, LTP chose to cloak himself in nationalism and concoct a conspiracy theory of great power machinations to cover his political retreat. His rally speech was an act of political manipulation, and ran counter to his own years-long policy of pragmatism on the Turkey and NK issues. His true feelings on the matter almost certainly are the points that he asserted to the ambassador privately. He has now proved himself willing to sell out his own policy views for the sake of personal political expedience — and would doubtless do so again if he thought it would help him weaken President Sargsian’s grip on power.
14. (C) While we may suspect that Ter-Petrossian would have behaved just as badly as the current authorities had he been the one in power — and certainly did so when he was in power himself — in fact it was the ruling regime that trampled on voters’ rights this year. Notwithstanding their standard-bearer’s lack of integrity, it is those LTP supporters who remain disenfranchised and unreconciled to the current government.
YOVANOVITCH