– How do you evaluate the statement of the Minsk Group co-chairs made in Deauville regarding the regulation of the NKR conflict? The Armenian side claims that it’s pro-Armenia because it implies an urge to exclude use of force.
– We should not treat very seriously to the statement made during the meeting of G8 because during these meetings every year they make statements about NKR. Usually during these meetings NKR conflict is no more important that the issue of global warming or world economic issues. But in relation to this statement there is a quite interesting circumstance. It was addressed to Azerbaijan and not Armenia that much. It was a claim to Azerbaijan to avoid use of force because of the recent threats and the latter’s reluctance of resolving the issue in a diplomatic manner. In this regard, the statement of the Minsk Group expressed a wider agenda. There is a much broader project for the year when the Minsk Group will attempt to bring Armenia and Azerbaijan to a consensus based on Madrid Principles. But Madrid Principles are not considered a peace treaty. It is a limit or agenda for the conduct of peaceful negotiations. And in regard of NKR conflict resolution we are quite remote from the process of peaceful and diplomatic conflict resolution. Now the peaceful process is in a different place. Today they are not speaking about NKR status or the rest of the details. It rolled back to the 90s when the priority was to prevent war or isolate the threat of war. They have a priority of brining Azerbaijan to the negotiation table.
– Is the threat of war so obvious now or is it exaggerated by the international community or political forces? During the previous years Azerbaijan has never stopped brining up the threat of war. Perhaps those are merely threats as well.
– There are two answers. The first proof comes from the Minsk Group. First the principles were two – self-determination of nations and territorial integrity. But during the last years they have added the agreement of no use of force. In the Minsk Group this is a big change. The recent year policies are connected with the threats of Azerbaijan to resume war. The threat of war is more realistic on part of Azerbaijan than in the previous years because lately Azerbaijan has become more active on the border. Starting from 1994, for the first time they have started to buy arms not only from Turkey but also from South Africa and Pakistan via Bosnia. And this is not a corruption agreement as in the past. These are not old or damaged weapons bought from Ukraine or Belarus. And this gives me grounds to think very seriously about the resumption of war. Azerbaijan realizes that if it starts the war it will lose. And I am more concerned about minor collisions, which may get out of control. This is a sign of weakness on part of Azerbaijan.
– There are always statements made by the Minsk Group and the presidents of the co-chair countries as well as other international organizations, which denounce the threat of war. Can Azerbaijan ignore those statements and start a war?
– Yes, that fear exists and there are two reasons for that. First of all Azerbaijan is somewhat right in its policy because feels that it was betrayed by Turkey and secondly, it can see that there is no progress for Baku in the negotiation process. And thus they threaten to deflect from the negotiation process. Secondly, Azerbaijan still hasn’t realized that it has lost the war. Even the Minsk group realizes that Karabakh will never return to Azerbaijan. So opposing the international community is not a big threat for Azerbaijan.
– Do you agree with the opinion that Russia and USA have come to a major agreement around the NKR conflict and that the approaches of these super powers have never been so close? And why did these countries come to an agreement in relation to NKR if in the past their interests have always contradicted to each other?
– After the war in Georgia Russia told USA that they can collaborate in relation to NKR conflict and they started to work with US and France. And both US and France are very happy that Russia can take the lead in this matter. But the factor that can drastically change the situation and bring certain progress is not in the frames of the Minsk Group. That factor is within Russia. The change of the policy of this country may play an essential role in the process. We can see that Russia has started to improve relations with Azerbaijan. The Russian-Turkish relations are at a high level. And Russia is so strong in Armenia that it can shift the policy here as well. This is a possible scenario and Armenia should be ready for that. And it’s clear that if it improves relations with Baku and probably it may start to have a much deeper military cooperation. In the opinion of Russia if they change the policy they will lose very little and Armenia only has a few levers to respond to those. Russia is very strong here. They may even improve their relations with the US. I am sure that Armenia can respond to that.
– Wouldn’t the response be that it may weaken the Russian influence in Armenia on behalf of the West?
– I wish so but it is a little too late for that. We have given to Russia our energy, communication and railroads, etc. Russia has a strategic control over Armenia’s economy. And Armenia has made a great mistake in the relations with Russia. But in reality Armenia has a greater importance for Russia than it thinks. Armenia is the only reliable partner of Russia in this region and the only Collective Pact member.
– NKR conflict and the possibility of war were even more signified in the internal politics of Armenia. ANC leader Ter-Petrosyan connects the opposition policy with that matter as well. Prosperous Armenia chairman Gagik Tsarukyan signed a new coalition declaration by signifying NKR issues. The authorities as well bring up the threat of war as a reason of their select policies.
– No, I don’t agree with that. The actual issue within the internal politics of Armenia is related to the proportion of power and not the NKR conflict. It is another issue if they bargain around NKR resolution. The actual challenge for me, however, is that we might be a little late. And the actual guarantees of strengthening democracy would be getting rid of oligarchs via rapid steps as opposed to a slow process. Of course, I welcome these changes and there is certain progress. However, it is too soon to make real judgments. The actual experiment will be closer to elections and a lot will depend on the outcome of elections.
– There is an opinion that the main initiator of a dialog between Armenian opposition and government is the US in the person of Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch.
– That process is quite realistic and it is not one of the projects of the US. Yes, the US Ambassador supported this process. So did EU envoy Peter Semneby but it wouldn’t have had happened without political will. This is an actual process and is not an American or European project. And that is the reason why we have actual progress.
– Which of the sides is more sincere in the matter of dialog? Is the government really willing to go to actual dialog and will the opposition really conduct the dialog in a transparent and public manner?
– We can’t tell who’s more sincere but it’s interesting to know who’s going to win. The greater political benefit is for the government and not the opposition. But there are greater risks for the government now because it was the government that raised expectations and criteria and there is no way back now.
– Do you find the concerns of other political parties of Armenia relevant, according to which ANC is in dialog with the government for the purpose of cooperation?
– I don’t share that opinion. It is their political viewpoint but progress is progress.