Moldova’s ruling Alliance for European Integration (AEI) was left stunned as low voter turnout failed the long-awaited constitutional referendum, making a snap parliamentary election inevitable.
Unexpected Failure
Moldova’s ruling collation, the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) was stunned by the failure of the 5 September constitutional referendum. The Central Elections Committee (CEC) chairman Yuri Chokan confirmed on 6 September that only 29.67% of registered Moldovan voters took part in the plebiscite. Since a minimum of 33.33% was required for the vote to be valid, the AEI’s long-awaited referendum collapsed. The four-party reformist coalition had put forward the referendum proposal in March to change, among others, Article 78 of the Moldovan constitution. This would replace the current practice of electing the president through a parliamentary vote and establish instead a nationwide election process. The main drive behind the referendum was to break the political standoff between 53 AEI and 45 opposition Communist deputies in the 101-mandate unicameral parliament. They have been at loggerheads since the popular uprising in June 2009—dubbed the Twitter Revolution—and the subsequent victory of the AEI over the Communists in the extra-term parliamentary election. The parliament has failed twice to elect a president—on 10 November and 7 December 2009. The AEI did not have the necessary two-thirds of votes, or 61 mandates, to elect its candidate, Marian Lupu. Conversely, the powerful Communist opposition, which until the June 2009 uprising had been at the helm of the state for eight years, chose to boycott the president’s elections to abort the current parliament. The Communists’ plan worked—two consecutive failures to elect a president invoked the constitutional requirement of disbanding the parliament and holding yet another extra-term election.
The AEI’s drive to push ahead with the referendum was a tactical move to avert the snap election even though the Moldovan constitutional court ruled in March that an extra-term legislative election will take place shortly after 1 June 2010. The reformist coalition was hoping that by removing the cause of stalemate from parliament, there will be no need to disband it. Meanwhile, universal suffrage would have given yet another opportunity for reformists and Communists to battle to capture the presidential office. Unsurprisingly, the Communists immediately resorted to boycotting the referendum, confident that the new election will bring them the necessary majority to bring Moldova under their control again.
Judging by the outcome of the 5 September referendum, the Communist plan has worked. The official final results are due in coming days, as the CEC is waiting for the protocols from polling stations abroad. Some of the members of the Committee have stated that only 21% of the voters cast votes, while Chokan put the figure slightly higher at 29%. The highest turnout was registered in the capital Chisinau, 30.7%, while the Gagauz Autonomous Republic had only 8.6% participation. Although the referendum was only 3% off succeeding, it is unlikely that the figures will change dramatically over the next 48 hours. The reformist Prime Minister Vlad Filat has already admitted the defeat, stating to the media that it was very bad to lose the referendum and swiftly adding that there was no need to make a tragedy out of it. He has since called for an extra-term parliamentary election to be held no later than November 2010, and at this point this is unavoidable.
Silent Voters’ Warning
Moldovan voters’ absence from voting stations is a clear warning to the AEI. The ruling bloc, consisting of the key operators behind the popular uprising—the Democratic Party of Moldova (DP), Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova (LDP) and the Liberal Party of Moldova (LP)—as well as the Our Moldova Alliance (AMN) is facing testing times ahead of the extra-term election and maintaining the popular support that peaked during the June 2009 revolution is paramount for its victory against the Communists. AEI leaders have tried to downplay their abysmal failure on 5 September. Filat and acting president Mihai Ghimpu blamed the Communists for aborting the referendum through scaremongering. While this may hold some truth, the Twitter Revolution coalition is also admitting that for their part they were unable to deliver a clear explanation of the importance of the vote.
The electorate chose to remain silent mainly for two reasons:
• Mixed Messages: The AEI coalition did not have a consistent message throughout the campaign and indeed during its short time in power. Thus Ghimpu, from the LP, has consistently advocated anti-Russian policies while talking about restoring historical unity with Romania. In May 2010 he refused to join the victory celebrations in the Russian capital Moscow which were attended by many Western leaders whose countries once fought against Nazi Germany, controversially stated that Moldova belonged to the camp of the defeated in the Second World War, and proceeded to declare 28 June as the Day of Soviet Occupation, a decree that was discarded as unconstitutional by the constitutional court in July 2010. Despite the assurances by the AEI member parties to Moldova’s large Russian-speaking electorate that there will be no unification with Moldova’s ethnic and linguistic kin Romania, some of its members have also suggested that the constitutional referendum should change the name of the country’s language from Moldovan to Romanian. These moves have catered to the nationalists’ camp but certainly antagonised the Russian speakers that make up almost half of the population and mainly support the Communists. The latter were quick to capitalise on the AEI’s internal divisions and warn voters against partaking in the referendum, which would advance the pro-Romanian unionists’ position.
• Feeble Progress on Reforms: Part of the voters’ reluctance to support the AEI is due to its less than impressive record on delivering any tangible changes for the past year. Most notably the corruption and nepotism continues plaguing the public service. The business environment has yet to improve for small and medium sized businesses. Despite the promises of quick European integration Moldova has not achieved any special status with the European Union (EU), and the EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton has decided to scrap the position of the EU special envoy to Moldova, among others. Furthermore, the government, forced by the 14.8% drop in GDP in 2009 has to raise utility bills a well as continue with unpopular austerity measures. Unsurprisingly, the Communists used these shortcomings and warned their voters, where pensioners are overrepresented, not to participate in the AEI-sponsored referendum that will solidify the ruling coalition and pave the way to pension cuts. Against the backdrop of social spending cuts and little progress on reforms, many Moldovan voters chose to refrain from politics on 5 September.
Outlook And Implications:
The referendum is a wake-up call for the AEI to prepare a unified message on foreign and domestic policy for the Moldovan electorate ahead of the extra-term election. Filat, the figurehead of the coalition, does not have much time to bring the coalition into order but he is also keen to have the election held by November. The PM’s urge to hold the legislative polls before winter and not in spring is most likely based on pragmatic calculation. Impoverished Moldova is facing a difficult winter, with utility prices rising. The reformist government’s popularity is likely to decline as the winter hardships mount, hence Filat is keen to hold the polls before this happens.
It must be said that the AEI is in a particularly difficult position as it inherited an economy in very bad shape and has been forced to follow unpopular austerity measures. Furthermore the changing priorities of the EU and its reluctance to embrace Moldova wholeheartedly are objective factors that undermine the ruling alliance’s foreign policy agenda of advancing Moldova’s EU integration. While these are objective obstacles, the AEI has to work towards engaging Russian-speaking voters, having a more realistic and workable anti–corruption plan and reaching internal unity to recapture its victory of June 2009 in the election.
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