Exclusive interview of Thomas de Waal, Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to “Mediamax” Agency for “168 Hours” Newspaper
– On April 22, Armenian President announced factual suspension of the process on normalizing relations with Turkey until Ankara demonstrates readiness to advance and ratifies protocols, singed in October, 2009. In fact the Armenian President complied with Barack Obama’s request, voiced at the recent meeting in Washington, and did not "kill" the process. However, if we take a realistic look at things, does this mean the end of the process or can one really expect its revival some time later?
– Given that the Turkish side was not going to ratify the protocols and President Sarkisian was under pressure to do something, he faced a choice between two bad options. He chose the less bad of the two and kept the door open for normalization in the future. But I fear that even after the Turkish elections next year nothing essential will have changed and the Turkish demand that there be progress on the Karabakh issue will keep the process stalled. The only positive thing is that there are now multiple contacts between the two societies and even business links. These will not disappear and are leading to greater confidence and understanding between Armenians and Turks.
– Nothing is said about Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenian-Turkish protocols; however representatives of the Turkish leadership has been openly and persistently stating over the past few months that normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is impossible without progress in Karabakh conflict settlement. These statements were made against the background of repeated urges of the U.S. to normalize relations without preconditions. According to you, was Turkey initially geared up for normalizing relations without progress in Karabakh issue or did Ankara and Washington simply fail to estimate the scales of Azerbaijan’s negative reaction?
– I think there was a series of misunderstandings and mixed messages here. President Gul pressed ahead with the normalization process with Armenia and made no mention of the Karabakh conflict even as Prime Minister Erdogan was insisting that Karabakh must be linked to the process. I see several factors: a difference in priorities between Gul and Erdogan; a rather naïve belief in Turkey that Armenia could be persuaded to make concessions on the Karabakh issue in return for ratification of the protocols; an under-estimation of how strong the reaction would be in Azerbaijan; the US administration promoting the process and “hoping for the best” and choosing not to factor in the Karabakh issue.
– Over the past two weeks, representatives of the Azerbaijani leadership made a number of tough statements addressed to Washington, openly accusing the U.S. Administration of "supporting Armenia" in Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement process. Next step of Baku was the cancellation of American-Azerbaijani military exercise planned for May. Don’t you think it’s strange that these steps are made already after Baku has in fact achieved its goal, that is to say, wrecked the process of Armenian-Turkish normalization? What is that Azerbaijan wants to get from the U.S.?
– Relations between Baku and Washington are bad on a number of fronts. There are two obvious symptoms: the persistent failure to appoint a new US ambassador to Baku and the fact that President Aliev was not invited to the Washington summit in April (evidently because there was a belief that he would interfere with attempts to negotiate a new deal between Armenia and Turkey).
Nowadays, Baku does not react quietly to what it perceives as snubs from foreign powers but makes its displeasure obvious. Another symptom of the bad relationship is that US secretary of state Hillary Clinton personally raised the issue of the two young jailed bloggers. It would be very easy for the Azerbaijani government to let them free as a gesture to Western countries but it did nothing.
– There is an opinion that factual freezing of Armenian-Turkish relations will be more painless for Moscow rather than for Washington, since, as opposed to the American-Turkish relations, where there are quite a few contradictions, the Russian-Turkish relations live through an unprecedented rise over the past few years. What is your opinion concerning this?
– Moscow definitely supported the Armenia-Turkey rapprochement for various reasons. It has an improving relationship with Turkey and most (but not all) policy makers saw the potential opening of the Armenia-Turkey border as a way of working with two partners in the region and further isolating Georgia. But Moscow also has an improving relationship with Azerbaijan and so it did not promote the process as strongly as the Americans did, content to see it succeed but not overly disappointed if it failed also.
– It is obvious that normalization of relations with Turkey will provide Armenia with far more opportunities for maneuver in foreign policy and will open the "door to the West". It is also obvious that Turkey is not going to sacrifice its interests to this factor. Does this mean that the U.S. and the West in general are unable to play the role of an efficient mediator at this stage?
– I think this whole episode illustrates how the Caucasus is still secondary to Iran, Afghanistan and Russia in US policy-making. Washington does not have many levers of influence over Turkey to make them proceed with the Protocols and needs Turkish support in its Iran policy. Everyone understands that in the long-term there are great benefits for everyone if the Armenia-Turkey border opens and more resources are expended on resolving the Karabakh conflict. But policy makers in Washington have short attention spans and want to see quick successes, rather than engage in long-term efforts. And as we know, the Caucasus can not be mended with quick interventions.