The Questions are Answers by Personal Representative of the President of the RA S. Sargsyan, Chairman of the Council of the Institute of Political Research umder the Administration of the President of the RA Mr. Garnik Isaghoulyan
– Why has not the independence of Nagorno Karabakh been recognized by Armenia?
– The international experience derived from the analysis of ethnopolitical conflict resumption and unfolding from an overt military confrontation to the phase of political settlement has clearly revealed that the mere recognition of sovereignty of a given territory is in no way an absolute guarantee for conflict resolution. There are ample examples: Taiwan is recognized by less than 30 states; Kosovo is backed by the recognition of almost 50 nations, of which 22 are member states of the European Union; Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain with almost unilateral recognition in the international arena; while the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognized solely by Turkey. All these cases illustrate that the full membership to international community of the territories declared as sovereign states presumes securing the recognition of those states that have previously acted as the main “opponents” of granting sovereignty to them. In this regard, the instructive examples of the latest developments in history bear particular significance for casting a more informed reflection on the above cases: Ethiopia recognized Eritrea, Indonesia recognized East Timor.
It is apparent that Taiwan and Kosovo will become full members of the international community once they are recognized by China and Serbia respectively, so will Abkhazia and South Ossetia, provided that they secure the recognition of Georgia. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be accepted to international community with no restrictions whatsoever, if it is recognized by the Republic of Cyprus and Greece.
Armenia refrains from recognizing the independence of NKR because with it the process of conflict resolution will unfold with less efficiency and, additionally, acquire more confrontational characteristics. For Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh is already an independent state-a state with de facto independence- the sovereignty of which in its fullest expression (de facto and de jure) paving the way to widespread international recognition is possible, if Azerbaijan adequately assesses the long-established reality and recognizes the NKR independence.
Representing the interests of the Armenian side at this stage of negotiation process on Karabakh conflict resolution, Armenia bears special responsibility for the efficiency and effectiveness of the process because it also represents the interests of the NKR. Only through freely expressed will of the Nagorno Karabakh people as the legitimate source of power in the republic will further steps en route to self-determination be decided.
Armenia does not decide on behalf of Nagorno Karabakh such issues as the choice of self-determination; it only contributes to the overall process of Karabakh conflict settlement to unfold in the constructive spirit that might eventuate in securing a necessary political compromise with the participation of all parties to conflict.
– What is compromise in the understanding of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh as an essential element contributing to Karabakh conflict resolution?
– The issue of compromise in Karabakh conflict is touched a lot and on different occasions. However, there is lack of common understanding both with respect to its overall nature and content.
It is high time therefore to proceed with precise definition regarding the scope and content of such a compromise for the parties to conflict. Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh speak on this matter with one identical voice. Compromise, implying some concessions from the Armenian side to make the conflict settlement process constructive and, understandably, calling for adequate and thus in many ways “compliant” action on the part of Azerbaijan, in our understanding denotes the following. It can be divided into several components: those already present at the current stage of negotiations qualifying as concessions made on the part of Armenia; and those possible in the future.
Elements of compromise at present: 1) the de jure non-recognition of the NKR independence so far by Armenia; 2) the two-sided format of current negotiations, which is sustained by Armenia representing the NKR in the negotiation process of Karabakh conflict resolution (taking into account that NKR has all the internationally backed legal foundations spelled out in international documents to participate in the negotiation process on its own, based on the internationally recognized status of the parties to conflict); and 3) the continuation of negotiations with Armenia in the current format, despite the ceaseless war rhetoric of Azerbaijan articulated at the highest official level on every possible occasion with clearly belligerent nature.
With respect to seven regions of the former Azerbaijani SSR frequently referred to as territories controlled by Nagorno Karabakh, the Armenian side does not question their historical, socio-cultural, political and legal identification as Armenian territories.
– Why does Armenia insist on the participation of NKR in the negotiation process?
– Neither the above mentioned concessions, nor the entire process of constructive conflict resolution seem feasible, if the previous status of Nagorno Karabakh as an immediate party to conflict is not restored in the negotiation process.
Although we talk of negotiation process, at present, it can hardly be construed as a finite and internationally consistent practice, since one of the internationally recognized parties to conflict in fact takes only indirect part in the process.
This is not say, however, that NKR is totally excluded from the present format of negotiations, since everything that happens in the negotiation process, including the activation of mediation efforts exerted by the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group that have real bearing on conflict resolution process involve notification, engagement or direct participation of the NKR. The capital of Nagorno Karabakh, Stepanakert, has recently served as one of the final destinations of “shuttle diplomacy” conducted by the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. The President of NKR is informed about all underlying developments in the negotiation process by the President of Armenia. Yet, the indirect participation of NKR in the negotiation process clearly affects the very nature of these negotiations. The absence of NKR in the present format of bilateral meetings between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs representing the conflicting parties, denotes one thing- negotiations as such do not exist. The current efforts of the two parties to conflict under the auspices of OSCE Minsk Group can be characterized at best as consultations, exchange of views, harmonization of principles, but not negotiations. To restore the genuine format and agenda of negotiations, the third party to conflict – the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh – needs to get a sit around the table for negotiations.
The participation of NKR in all official processes of Karabakh conflict resolution is a necessary and indispensable condition for putting the whole peace process on the right and constructive track.
– Why does Armenia continue to participate in bilateral talks with Azerbaijan, if the immediate participation of NKR in negotiations is not restored at this stage?
– The answer is evident from the above. And this is exactly where the constructive approach of Armenia to the entire process of Karabakh conflict resolution and the one-sided concessions made so far in negotiations are reflected.
The picture of Karabakh conflict negotiation process is distorted and does not correspond to its real nature. The origins of this disparity lie in general misapprehension of the Karabakh conflict as one between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is an absolute distortion of the real image of the conflict, which is promoted by Azerbaijan as a given fact. In fact, it is the Azerbaijani “phobia” and wishes disguised as “reality.”
Armenia has always been next to NKR, but never in its stead. Thus was from the very beginning of Karabakh conflict in 1988, during the military aggression of Azerbaijan against Nagorno Karabakh (military actions in 1991-1994), and was continued after the cease-fire agreement of May 1994 by the three parties to conflict that to this date underlies the process of peaceful conflict settlement.
Even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989-1990, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh have consistently, albeit along separate pattern of routes, moved toward their final independence. It is a well known fact that on December 1, 1989 the Armenian SSR and Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) made a decision to reunite under the auspices of one Armenia. Based on this decision, elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR held on May 20, 1990 also envisaged the participation of the NKAR people (11 polling stations were opened in the area of NKR). The representatives of the NKAR were, as a result, elected to the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of Armenia. In contrast to this, the Azerbaijani SSR was actively involved in the processes evolving around the preservation of the Soviet Union (in the referendum of March 17, 1991 the overwhelming majority of the AzSSR population voted for preservation of a unitary Soviet system). Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, on the contrary, opted for a different path aimed at building and strengthening of their own statehood. Neither in the territory of Armenia, nor that of Nagorno Karabakh, had the union-wide referendum of March 17, 1991 taken place.
We can say with certainty that Nagorno Karabakh experienced the open aggression of Azerbaijan while determining the course of its state-building process and the institutional underpinnings of its future statehood. This was methodically continued on December 1, 1989 affecting all Armenians of the Soviet Azerbaijan, who experienced the final wave of ethnic cleansing perpetrated in the territory of their residence (Baku pogroms in mid-January, 1990), and September 2, 1991, when Azerbaijan mounted a state-sponsored military campaign targeted at the destruction of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh.
Throughout all stages of Karabakh conflict resolution, Armenia has tried to do everything possible to contribute to its peaceful settlement, deploying a wide variety of diplomatic tools to ensure its constructive engagement in the negotiation process. Even nowadays, which is continuing since 1998, when NK was “left out” from the official process of negotiations, Armenia bears its particular share of burden in the Karabakh conflict resolution process speaking on behalf of itself and the NKR.
However, the Armenian efforts suffer serious pitfalls. The decision to shoulder additional burden taken in 1998 by Armenia was largely determined by the desire to help neutralize Azerbaijani “phobia” to hold direct negotiations with Nagorno Karabakh. Every passing year comes to confirm that Azerbaijan is abusing the goodwill shown by Armenia, and exerts every effort to present it in a different light. So too does the growing military rhetoric inspired by oil and gas revenues that completely excludes any possibility of considering NKR as a self-sufficient and irreplaceable subject of Karabakh conflict resolution. Instead, Azerbaijan has unleashed open propaganda against Armenia aimed at representing the Armenian side as an aggressor in all international forums of interstate cooperation. Taking advantage of every opportunity, Azerbaijan represents itself as a victim, while Armenia is constantly presented in the image of an aggressor that has seized its lands.
Armenia could have been suspected of conducting aggressive policy, were it, for example, to seize the territory of Nakhichevan during the hostilities of 1991-1994. Moreover, there were strong political and legal grounds for it. Even before the Turkish occupation of the area in 1918, Nakhichevan, with reference to international agreements, had long been part of Armenia (Nakhijevan in Armenian) and only by the Treaty of Kars in 1921 did it receive the status of an autonomous territory under the patronage of Azerbaijani SSR. Having rejected the past legacy of the Azerbaijani SSR in accordance with the Acts passed in 1991, the Republic of Azerbaijan is no longer the legal successor of the Soviet Azerbaijan. Therefore the underlying norms of the Treaty of Kars regarding the status of Nakhijevan have no bearing whatsoever on Azerbaijan and the inclusion of Nakhijevan as an autonomous republic of Azerbaijan stands in stark violation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty. Consistent with Article 5 of the Treaty, Armenia serves as a guarantor of Nakhijevan’s status as an autonomous territory under the patronage of Azerbaijan, but not as part of it. If this norm is violated by other parties to agreement (Turkey and Azerbaijan), Armenia is authorized to take whatever steps it deems necessary to safeguard its interests, taking into account the previous status of Nakhijevan preceding the Treaty of Kars.
In addition, the comparison of the two articles of the Treaty of Kars on the basis of which territorial issues were resolved in relation to Nakhijevan and Adjara (Articles 5 and 6 respectively), reveals that if under Article 6 Turkey “agrees to cede to Georgia suzerainty” over Adjaria, Article 5 clearly stipulates that Armenia only agreed that “Nakhijevan, within the limits specified by Annex III to the present Treaty, constitutes an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan.” Thus, Armenia is not only the current guarantor of the status of Nakhijevan region, as defined by the Treaty of Kars, but also retains the right to call for the review of its status, since it has not rejected, in principle, its sovereignty over that territory.
The political constituent of possible Armenian reaction with regard to Nakhijevan in early 1990s indicates that at a time of intensive military operations in the zone of Karabakh conflict in 1992, Armenia was under the imminent threat of Turkish intervention, which could have manifested itself either through direct invasion of Turkish troops into the territory Armenia or the military occupation of Nakhijevan by Turkey. Given these threats, Armenia could have taken preventive security measures to protect its borders, in particular, those emanating from Nakhijevan. Considered from a purely military vantage point, it would have constituted no particular difficulty for the Armed Forces of Armenia. This did not happen, however. And it comes to confirm that suspecting Armenia of any aggressive intentions in the South Caucasus is unwarranted.
Today, the foundations, let alone the prerequisites for considering Azerbaijan as a party to conflict willing to secure a political compromise on the Karabakh settlement issue on the basis of trust and further reconciliation, are completely absent.
Consistent with the National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the second paragraph below the rubric of introductory notes refers to “military aggression of Armenia,” which “the young Republic (i.e. Azerbaijan) faced in the early years of its independence.” Throughout the entire presentation of the concept, a constant reference is made to the “aggression of Armenia” and “the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” Furthermore, below the subtitle on “Cooperation with regional countries,” the National Security Concept of Azerbaijan declares that “it is unacceptable for the Republic of Azerbaijan to cooperate with Armenia until it abandons this [aggressive] policy.”
Against the backdrop of these categorical statements embodied in the conceptual documents of Azerbaijan, the relevant provisions in the National Security Strategy of Armenia are sustained by a correct political and legal wording, reflecting the objective reality of the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. The National Security Strategy of Armenia emphasizes the absence of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, “due to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.” It is advisable therefore to specify the relevant provision of the National Security Strategy of Armenia, which is fully consistent with the nature of its participation in the Karabakh conflict settlement process: “Azerbaijan has adopted a policy aimed at the exclusion of Armenia from all projects of regional cooperation. Azerbaijan continuously refuses to open its communication routes with Armenia and denies all Armenian and international initiatives to engage in bilateral cooperation in an attempt to exert pressure on Armenia regarding the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Armenia believes that the bilateral and regional cooperation could build confidence and have a serious positive impact on the overall situation. Armenia will continue its confidence building efforts and to this end will encourage cooperation, contacts and visits on every level.”
The National Security Concept of Azerbaijan was adopted in late May 2007, more than three months later from the date marking the adoption of the National Security Strategy of Armenia. Thus, the Azerbaijani leadership has clearly had the opportunity to familiarize itself with the relevant provisions of the National Security Strategy of Armenia and to determine its positions and priorities regarding the prospects for establishing bilateral relations with its western neighbor. However, as a response to the Armenian proposal of regional cooperation to create mutual confidence, Azerbaijan has further tighten its position, as reflected in the notorious reports of the country submitted to the UN General Assembly in late December 2008.
This policy continues even nowadays. Officials in Azerbaijan speak of international crimes committed in the territory of Azerbaijan at a time of Armenian aggression. In their individual remarks, the latter attempt to link the prosecution and subjection of the “individuals responsible for committing international crimes in the course of Armenian aggression to international responsibility” to provisions of the National Security Concept of Azerbaijan. Thus, the first deputy Military Prosecutor of Azerbaijan, “head of the joint investigative task force to investigate crimes committed during the aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan,” I. Mammadov, recently noted that “the National Security Concept of Azerbaijan is adopted in accordance with international conventions of May 27, 2007 with clear reference to subjecting the perpetrators of international crimes in the territory of Azerbaijan to criminal responsibility.” The Azerbaijani side, through its first deputy Military Prosecutor, also warned that “after subjecting these individuals to criminal responsibility for the atrocities they have committed, and further investigation, the number of suspects will dramatically increase.”
In addition to external dimensions of propaganda, Azerbaijan is also exerting enormous efforts in its domestic affairs aimed at indoctrination of the country’s public opinion.
If the current position of Azerbaijan remains unaltered, Armenia may well withdraw from the present format of bilateral negotiations, reserving the right of engagement, once the internationally accepted trilateral format of negotiations is restored.
– How can the immediate participation of NKR contribute to the process of Karabakh conflict resolution?
– With this change in place, the entire negotiation process would take a complete and constructive shape. In addition, it will set the foundation for the two main parties to conflict represented by the NKR and Azerbaijan to secure agreements across the whole spectrum of issues liable to be meaningfully addressed through their direct participation. These issues include: 1) mutual recognition as sovereign states; 2) mutual guarantees to refrain from the threat or use of force at the current stage of conflict resolution, and in subsequent interstate relations; 3) exchange of territories for the restoration of the territorial integrity of each other within the boundaries that would ensure safe and secure development of the two republics; and 4) addressing issues pertaining to the return of Azerbaijani and Armenian internally displaced persons to the territories of their former residence on the principle of voluntary and safe return.
In addition, this format of talks could, at later stages of successful conflict resolution, envision the involvement of Azerbaijani population of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) in the process, who have abandoned the territory of Nagorno Karabakh in 1991-1992. Representatives of the Azerbaijani population might be involved in discussions about their future status in Nagorno-Karabakh, where they could enjoy all the internationally recognized rights of national minorities in a democratic state.
For its part, the NKR could engage in drafting and adopting a comprehensive concept at the state level regarding the political, socio-economic and cultural integration of the Azerbaijani population of former NKAR into the mainstream of social life in Nagorno Karabakh.
– What is the present focus of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs and external actors in the process of Karabakh conflict resolution?
– Both the mediators and external actors around the Karabakh conflict resolution process are primarily interested in the following: transfer of territories controlled by NKR to Azerbaijan (the widely shared approach encompasses the transfer of five districts, except for Kelbajar and Lachin provinces of the former Azerbaijani SSR) and leaving NKR with the de facto statehood by grating it an interim status prior to the conduct of referendum on self-determination in Nagorno Karabakh.
The mediators do not pursue long-term resolution to the conflict. On the contrary, their actions are guided by short-term imperatives; that is, giving the territories controlled by Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan. In their understanding “compromise” entails the transfer of seven districts to Azerbaijan, while Nagorno Karabakh, as a consequence, is left with vague security guarantees and the de facto statehood. Beyond this, none of the co-chairs has anything to offer at this stage.
The co-chairs, moreover, do not pay due attention to the arguments of the Armenian side that the proposed “concessions” are not viable for securing peace and stability in the long run.
Drawing on the past experience, it becomes apparent that the fundamental elements underlying the formation of state independence of Nagorno Karabakh have oftentimes escaped the grip of external actors. Against the background of global challenges facing the major actors in the international arena, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, the Karabakh issue has acquired secondary and situational characteristics. This has not changed even nowadays, further impeding external actors to examine the underlying bases of the right of Nagorno Karabakh people to build their own statehood.
– Would the transfer of at least one area from those presently controlled by NKR attribute constructive elements to the process of Karabakh conflict resolution as compared with the status quo currently held regarding this issue?
– Absolutely not is the shortest answer to the posed question.
Indeed, one of the major obstacles to peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict is the misconception that the transfer of some or all territories controlled by the NKR to Azerbaijan will contribute to bringing the settlement process closer.
The transfer of at least one area or the sheer part of it to Azerbaijan will, on the contrary, significantly intensify the military rhetoric and efforts of Azerbaijan encouraging it to the ultimate seizure of NKR. Moreover, the transfer of even one area will invigorate Azerbaijan towards adopting harsher position with ever growing “appetite.” All this can lead to easily predictable consequences. Soft position of Armenia on this issue will strengthen the Azerbaijani cause to pursue the return of all controlled territories by staging demonstrative actions underlining the damage done to the “occupied” territories throughout the 15 years of Armenian control with further demands for compensation for the damage inflicted on Azerbaijan. Furthermore, the fortified arrangements left along the ceasefire line now serving as Azerbaijani rear will instantly be used for mounting new devastating military actions against the NKR through “uncontrolled” yet fully sanctioned “guerrilla war” instigated from the territories returned to Azerbaijan. The transportation and communication links of NKR and Armenia, moreover, will certainly turn into open targets subject to different military assaults from Azerbaijan. Pursuing the advocacy of its current propagandistic course, Azerbaijan will resort to a wide variety of options, among which, the claims filed to international courts demanding compensation for material and moral damage incurred as well as the subjection of Armenian politicians and the military to international criminal responsibility “for the very fact of occupation of Azerbaijani territories and ensuing consequences” are commonly known. That such actions in international arena are common to Azerbaijan is easy to identify, given the UN reports of this country in December 2008.
The transfer of at least one district or even part of it to Azerbaijan will critically affect the internal political situation of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, since the appearance of “dissatisfied masses” will embolden Azerbaijan to exploit the domestic fragmentation of both Armenia and the NKR. In this regard, one can easily recall the incident of March 3-4, 2008 along the line of contact between the NKR and Azerbaijani forces near the village Levonarkh.
By offering international security guarantees to NKR and an interim status of incomplete international standing in return for territorial concessions to Azerbaijan, the mediators, in fact, put the entire architecture of balance of power in the region at peril.
It should be recalled that even during the totalitarian Soviet system the central authorities were unable to ensure the safety of the Armenian population in Azerbaijani SSR. In fact, the central apparatus of the Soviet system wielded the arsenal of all necessary tools and techniques that could drastically suppress any manifestation of unlawful acts in relation to Soviet citizens. However, it proved incapable of timely responding to the massacres and ethnic cleansing of Armenians in the Azerbaijani SSR, perpetrated in the areas of their settlements in Sumgait, Baku, Kirovobad and other cities of Soviet Republics, where regional and city committees of state security services, internal affairs, internal troops detachments and other law enforcement organs of the USSR were stationed. From this vantage point, the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh and all persons of Armenian origin forced to flee their homes in 1988-1991 have every reason to call into question the proposed international guarantees of security. This is all the more true taking into account that the international mediators are often simply incapable of performing their tasks. In this latter connection, it will do well to remember the tragic example of Srebrenica during the war in former Yugoslavia.
The security guarantees of Azerbaijan, even those backed by the assurances from international community, are completely inadmis-sible for the Armenian side, since Azerbaijan continues to act as an irresponsible partner incapable of living up to its international obligations. The obligations spelled out in the agreement of all three parties to conflict on February 6, 1995 to strengthen the ceasefire regime along the line of contact are not met, nor do the confidence-building measures proposed by international mediators engage the Azerbaijani support. In their statement in Helsinki on December 4, 2008 the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries proposed the parties to conflict to remove snipers from the line of contact. Again, Azerbaijan failed to live up to even these expedient measures of confidence-building.
The course of actions subscribed to by Azerbaijan has turned the latter into a hostage of its own inconsiderate actions, leaving no room for the introduction of comprehensive trust-building measures as necessary prerequisites at particularly this stage of conflict resolution process. In this connection, Azerbaijan’s efforts aimed at resettlement of the Azerbaijani population in NKR are a case in point. While in principle acknowledging the right of Azerbaijani people for return, NKR warns of its dire consequences as regards the total lack of desirable atmosphere and trust that might bring further havoc to the peace process. Given the tough posture of Azerbaijan against the return of Armenian refugees to their places of residence in Baku, Sumgait, Kirovabad and other Azerbaijani settlements, trust-building measures between the principal parties to conflict – Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan – in this and other issues of conflict settlement are not attainable at this stage.
– What are the basic elements of the regional balance of forces in the Karabakh conflict zone?
– The cease-fire agreement attained through the immediate participation of Nagorno Karabakh in 1994 can not be sustained in any meaningful way without the Armed Forces of the NKR. Neither the external forces in the region, nor their willingness to allocate the necessary resources would suffice to ensure the maintenance of cease-fire regime, let alone making the parties to conflict refrain from engaging in intense and full-scale military actions. The efficiency of NKR army as a regional force therefore serves as an essential element offsetting the disengagement of external powers in the Karabakh conflict and the deployment of peacekeeping military contingents.
Identified long before the aggression of Azerbaijan against the NKR, the original borders of Nagorno Karabakh incorporated the territories of Karabakh lowlands presently controlled by the NKR (historical territories of Artsakh). The control of these territories not only provides the security of the NKR, but also serves as a punishment of the aggressor for the escalation of the conflict to a large-scale military confrontation. The status of these territories is defined by the NKR Constitution as “territories under factual jurisdiction of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh” (Art. 142).
The geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of these areas in terms of maintaining peace and security in the Caucasus at large is beyond questioning. Furthermore, the reality of incorporating the territories of the Karabakh conflict in the geopolitical and geo-economic projects backed by the external forces is determined by the very the existence of these territories or, more precisely, the control of Armenian forces.
The uniqueness of the military-political balance of power established in the zone of Karabakh conflict highlights the fact that NKR is not merely a consumer, but rather a producer of so indispensable an attribute in the modern world as security. It is important to note that all partially recognized states constituting the political map of the present-day world have long been and still are the main consumers of security. Since its de facto inception, Nagorno Karabakh, on the contrary, has served as a major producer of regional security by repelling the Azerbaijani aggression of large-scale military endeavors in 1991-1994 and continues to do so, relying on the virtues of its own army and the territories of Karabakh lowlands. In this context, the latter two components serve as strong guarantees against the resumption of hostilities and ward off the potential aggressor from troubling the peace in the conflict zone.
The geoeconomic importance of the balance of power state in the region and the role of NKR in its maintenance are of no minor significance too. For example, the recent experience drawn from “unfreezing” the South Ossetian conflict revealed that the underlying risks of the conflict might lead to the complete interruption, delay or reorientation of the regional pipeline and transportation routes. The replication of this scenario in the Karabakh conflict would bring irreparable damage to the interests of external and regional actors, long-term suspension or complete reorientation of important energy routes. Any imbalance resulting from the military escalation in the zone of Karabakh conflict might completely “halt” pipeline projects, and not simply suspend their exploitation.
– What is the position of major external actors on the issue of maintaining status quo in the Karabakh conflict?
– The status quo situation around the Karabakh conflict is referred to in different discussions that capitalize on the territorial aspects of the issue. In other words, considerations regarding the status quo in the Karabakh conflict cannot but touch the issue of territories.
On the whole, maintaining status quo in the Karabakh conflict and hence leaving the territorial issue as it currently is – with 5 districts completely and 2 partially controlled by Nagorno Karabakh, while Shahumyan in its entirety and part of Martakert and Martuni districts controlled by Azerbaijan – is beneficial for all parties to conflict taken together and none of them considered separately. The commitment of all three parties to conflict to maintain status quo may indeed contribute to the overall negotiation process and ensure the constructive engagement of the conflicting parties to seek peaceful resolution. However, any unilateral attempt aimed at pursuing slight alteration in the present status quo situation will raise the suspicion of the remaining parties and rightly so.
Presently, Azerbaijan is absolutely unprepared to pursue either military solution in terms of reversing the status quo state of affairs in the conflict area or contribute to its peaceful resolution by non-military means. The main reason accounting for the reluctance of the governing regime in Azerbaijan to make concessions (as it perceives it) on Karabakh issue is the domestic political constraints. Nor is it ready to work within the framework entailing “exchange of territories for status” mostly due its domestic propaganda aimed at inculcating the idea of seizing more at the negotiations table. This is a typical example of zero-sum mindset that characterizes the Azerbaijani approach to negotiations. To put it differently, “concessions” in Azerbaijani understanding presuppose the return of all territories to Azerbaijan as well as positioning its troops on far better strategic locations around NKR in exchange for “nothing” more than the granting of wider autonomy to Nagorno Karabakh and opening communication with Armenia would entail.
Accordingly, the revision of the status quo from “inside” (initiated by three parties to conflict) is not possible in the years to come. However, there are external actors as well with certain resources not particularly deployed for exerting pressure on parties to conflict, but rather guiding the negotiation process towards a mutually acceptable outcome.
Positions currently dominating among the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group on the status quo in Karabakh conflict can be summarized the following way: 1) maintenance of status quo should prevail unless it is replaced by sound mechanisms and guarantees acceptable to all conflicting parties. A special heed is given to the security concerns of NKR and the objective concerns of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians when discussing issues related to the return of controlled territories; 2) maintenance of status quo does not lead to securing a “compromise,” as represented in the following scheme: “transfer of territories and return of IDPs (Azerbaijan) and granting an interim status to Nagorno-Karabakh with referendum to be held in 5, 10 or 15 years (Armenia)” and; 3) maintenance of the status quo affects the efficiency of the peace process and requires substantial revision.
– Can Azerbaijan seize the territories under the control of Nagorno Karabakh by military means?
– We are ready for any scenario, including war, which Azerbaijan could unleash against us. We, however, believe that the leadership of Baku has enough reason to refrain from such a destructive – particularly for itself – step. Were Azerbaijan to start a new war, it would be defeated, just as previously, but with greater losses.
The estimations of distinguished experts on Karabakh conflict contend that no other conflict capitalizes on the use of coercive force and revenge as the one in Karabakh, which is articulated openly at the highest level. Nowhere else are there so many incidents occurring along the line of contact between the troops as in Karabakh, increase of military spending, especially in Azerbaijan, growing imbalances in the economy and military budgets of the two states that give rise to dangerous temptations and illusions.
In 1990-1992, getting hold of virtually all weapons of the former Soviet Army divisions as well as that of MVD (special militia detachments) and KGB troops of the USSR stationed on its territory, the Azerbaijani procurement of arms and military equipment, along with ammunition and other military equipment, outweighed those of Georgia, Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh taken together. In addition, Azerbaijan inherited a large amount of aircraft technologies and part of the Caspian naval capacity, while Armenia received neither combat aircraft, nor of course military and naval armament. According to western experts, the overwhelming military and technological superiority of Azerbaijan vis-à-vis Armenia and the NKR Defense Army, particularly evident after the Azerbaijani acquisition of hundreds of tanks and armored combat vehicles from Ukraine in 1992-1994, was the main reason triggering arms race in the South Caucasus.
By mid-1993, i.e. at a time of full-scale hostilities in Karabakh conflict Azerbaijan possessed 458 tanks, 1264 armored vehicles, 395 pieces of artillery, 63 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 53 military and 52 training aircraft, 18 combat and 15 transport helicopters. Given its enormous superiority in armaments and military equipment, Azerbaijan sustained heavy losses in 1991-1994, leaving behind 186 tanks, 119 armored vehicles, 59 artillery systems and 43 tank carriers, 114 armored vehicles, and almost 51 pieces of artillery, which were completely destroyed and could not be put into service. In addition, almost 20 Azerbaijani aircraft and 21 helicopters were destroyed. To restore the rapid decline of its superiority, Azerbaijan, throughout the entire war time, engaged in the purchase of armaments from abroad, namely, from Ukraine, acquiring 150 T-55 tanks, and 10 combat aircraft of which eight MiG-21 fighters, and two Su-17 fighter-bombers.
In the light of existing conditions, the political-military balance in the zone of Karabakh conflict can be characterized as both qualitative and quantitative equality of the opposing forces. In addition to purely technical indicators, an important role is also played by the geographical factor and convenient, from defense perspective, location and configuration of the NKR borders. The quantitative superiority of Azerbaijan’s military equipment and personnel is largely offset by the qualitative superiority of the Armed Forces of Armenia and the NKR Defense Army. Of further importance is the complex correlation of different types and systems of armaments, as well as the potential of their effective use in the case of conflict resumption: Azerbaijan’s superiority in offensive weapons is clearly offset by favorable (from military perspective) defensive positions of NKR. In other words, the current defensive configuration of the Karabakh Army positions (including the territories of Karabakh lowlands) ensures the elimination or reduction of threats to regional security posed by Azerbaijani uncontrolled purchase of weapons and military equipment.
The ongoing militarization of Azerbaijan, aimed at creating imbalance of military and political forces in the conflict zone, in particular, through procurement of such weapons that could yield warfare and psychological superiority to the offensive side (in this regard the procurement of 12 MLRS “Smerch” rocket systems of Azerbaijan from Ukraine consistent with the characteristics of weapons of mass destruction), is a good case in point.
The widely publicized achievement of Azerbaijan continually highlighting the high growth rate of its military budget serves as an instrument to exert psychological pressure on the Armenian side, rather than a real indicator of its ability to bring qualitative changes in the sphere of its military industry. In addition to widespread corruption and dependence of the current Azerbaijani regime on military personnel policies conducted in the defense sector in previous years, a particular risk underlying the decision of Azerbaijan to resume hostilities in the zone of Karabakh conflict is linked to its domestic stability. In such circumstances, any attempt of war resumption by Azerbaijan will cast the vitality of the current political regime of the country into absolute dependence on the “military success.” Success, as Azerbaijan would have it, entails not only the complete seizure of seven districts, but also that of entire Nagorno Karabakh and the expulsion of Armenians.
The experience derived from the study of modern local conflicts reveals that the success of a military campaign not only depends on the quantitative calculations of power and military-technical capabilities of the opposing sides, but also on the interaction of military factors with that of non-military means of victory: political, psychological, ideological and, in particular, the ability of parties to mobilize the social forces for the legitimization of the military action. The time factor in this regard is of particular significance, as Azerbaijan – the most likely initiator of hostilities – is certain to face far more severe restrictions in legitimizing the military campaign than the society and the people of Karabakh, for whom this war is no more than a struggle for existence.
As the history of colonial wars and the present confrontation between the former centers and unrecognized state entities (or de facto states) shows, the asymmetry of will and purpose between the parties to conflict leads to a situation-as best captured in the expression of a renowned western expert – in which “the de facto states play a long game, where not to lose is to win.” Nagorno Karabakh might not win another war with Azerbaijan (be it a “blitzkrieg,” a “trenched warfare” or “remote” battles of exhaustion). Be that as it may, even with this outcome it will not lose. As for the Azerbaijani military and political leadership, which persistently calls for revenge and return of Karabakh by military means for already 15 years, any outcome of fighting, but full control over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, will entail both political and military defeat with subsequent irreversible consequences, particularly for the ruling elite of the country.
Proper assessment of the situation also requires taking into account the role and possible use of containment policy by Armenia. The probable outbreak of hostilities in the zone of Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation is reduced with each next round in arms race. Seemingly ironic, this situation has been common since the time of the Cold War and is well researched by political scientists. The arms race sets into motion the mechanism of mutual containment, when the military potentials of the parties to conflict become so high that any benefit a country might hope to get from starting the war cannot compensate for sustained human and material losses, let alone the political consequences of a negative reaction on the part of the international community. In regard to theories elaborated in the framework of military-strategic studies and validated by the experience ensuing from the maintenance of international and regional security in recent decades, containment refers to the prevention of unwanted political and military actions by one party against another (usually weak in its quantity and power capacity) by threatening it with undesirable damage.
Therefore, any possible resolution of Karabakh conflict must necessarily envisage its durability, long-term stability and confidence of the parties that the losses incurred by the state initiating the hostilities will, in any event and outcome of the armed conflict, surpass the benefits of starting a war.
– What is the position of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh on Karabakh conflict resolution?
– Throughout the entire process of NKR international recognition, dating back to January 6, 1992, when the democratically elected parliament of Nagorno Karabakh appealed to the UN and other countries of the world to recognize the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh and help prevent the genocide of the Artsakh Armenians till now, the foreign policy of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic with respect to finding a durable solution to the conflict is based on the following principles: 1) determination of the status of Nagorno Karabakh is the exclusive right of the people of the republic; 2) mutual recognition, leading to a peaceful co-existence of the two sovereign states that rules out the possibility of seeking a military solution to the conflict. Recognition of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Azerbaijan as equal entities of international law; 3) international guarantees ensuring the security of the people of Nagorno Karabakh as carriers of the sovereignty and legitimate source of power in the republic; 4) restoration of the territorial integrity of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and its exclusion as an enclave; 5) mutually acceptable resolution of the territorial issues and problems concerning refugees and internally displaced people within the framework of a peace agreement between the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan.
On the whole, the position of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic with respect to negotiations centers around the idea that any meaningful agreement of conflict resolution should, above all else, tackle the underlying causes of the conflict (the political status of Nagorno Karabakh and its security), and then only turn to the consideration of issues relating to the consequences of the conflict (disputable territories, refugees, restoration of communications, etc.).
Mutual recognition of the NKR and Azerbaijan ruling out the possibility of a military solution to the conflict should be the starting and not the ultimate point of negotiations between them. The issues of territories, refugees and the determination of borders should be resolved on a reciprocal basis, with NKR and Azerbaijan represented as the main parties to agreement and it should be synchronized with the peace process.
As a principal measure aimed at contributing to the process of conflict resolution to (evolve) unfold in a constructive way, as well as strengthening the security in the conflict zone, where the parties continue to sustain losses among their respective troops (hence, the phase of armed conflict can not be regarded as complete) a tripartite agreement on ceasefire, concluded in May 1994, could well be supplemented by the “Agreement on Cessation of Armed Conflict,” which would ban the use of force and reinforce all parties to refrain from the threat of using force against each other.
The foreign policy of NKR with respect to its exclusion from the official framework of negotiations is grounded on the principle that any preliminary agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan – representing two of the three parties to the conflict – is greeted and considered as a necessary, but not sufficient, constituent in the overall process of conflict resolution. Furthermore, the practical implementation of any concluded agreement can not be meaningfully carried out without the involvement of the NKR in the negotiation process on all contentious issues underlying the conflict settlement and in the implementation of any prior agreements in its territory.
– Why does not the process of Karabakh conflict resolution address the issue of Armenian refugees forced out from their places of compact residence in the former Azerbaijani SSR?
– The short answer is that the Armenian side has never been persistent in putting the issue on the agenda of current talks.
The issue of refugees and enforced migrants is severely distorted in the overall representation of the Karabakh conflict and further impedes to build an objective picture of the underlying causes and effects which, taken together, negatively impact the process of conflict resolution.
For the Armenian side, the issue of refugees and internally displaced people was, in a sense, one of the major reasons underlying the claim of Nagorno Karabakh about its withdrawal from the Azerbaijani SSR (Sumgait and Baku massacres of Armenians were carried out in 1988-1990; that is, at a time of Soviet Union). In Azerbaijan, however, the same issue cropped up in the end of 1991, when the newly proclaimed Republic of Azerbaijan subscribed to the use of coercive force as a means of conflict resolution, creating a huge number of refugees and internally displaced people on its territory as a consequence of the selected course. Thus, from the Armenian perspective the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons is one of the underlying causes of the conflict; for Azerbaijan, on the contrary, it is the consequence of the military actions initiated by itself.
Below is a brief assessment of the issue of refugees and forced migrants in the zone of Karabakh conflict and around it: 1) the actual number of Armenian refugees from the territory of Azerbaijani SSR (excluding the population of former NKAR) was roughly 500 thousand people; 2) the Armenian refugees lost all or virtually all of their possessions, with major losses sustained in the loss of real property; 3) the remaining part of the Azerbaijani population of Armenian SSR moved into the territory of Azerbaijani SSR in the end of 1989 and received compensation from the authorities of Armenia; 4) almost all of the adult male population of Azerbaijan referred to as forced migrants from the territories of Karabakh lowlands were active participants of the fighting on the side of Azerbaijan, and therefore can not be treated on equal footing, as long as international law is concerned, with peaceful Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, who suffered from the acts of genocidal nature; 5) the accurate number of Azerbaijani civilians who fled the territory of Karabakh lowlands during the fighting in 1992-1994 is no more than (probably much less, once the point made above is taken into account) 500 thousand people.
In 1988-1990, the people of Armenian origin in the Azerbaijani SSR were subjected to massive deportations. The Armenian population was forced out solely for its ethnic belonging and against the backdrop of inaction, to put it mildly, of the leadership of Soviet Azerbaijan. The denial of past legacy of AzSSR by the present authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan does not entail that having declared a democratic state and having assumed legal obligations regarding the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties, the latter can easily evade from the compensation of physical and moral harm, and from the compensation of material damages to people subjected to genocide and ethnic cleansing.
The distorted representation of the issue of actual refugees and forced migrants in the zone of Karabakh conflict and around it strengthens the Azerbaijani allegations that, as long as the humanitarian aspect of the conflict is concerned, Azerbaijan is the sole victim, whose rights must be restored instantly and without delay. The restoration of “rights” per se is further conceived of as the unconditional return of the Azerbaijani population to the territory of Nagorno Karabakh in its present borders.
The Armenian side does not oppose it altogether, but with one necessary clarification in place, namely, that the same course of actions, entailing the recognition of the right to return and creation of appropriate conditions for safe and secure existence is envisaged for all Armenian refugees forced out from their places of residence in the former Azerbaijani SSR. In other words, this conditionality should be comprehensively transformed into parity and cooperation of all parties to conflict in the issue of restoring the rights of refugees and forced migrants and thereby exclude any confrontational manifestation leading to impasse.
Among other things, one of the key issues that could pave the way for a constructive dialogue between the two main parties to conflict – Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan – is that of Armenian refugees from the former Azerbaijani SSR. Any attempt to exclude this group of people from the overall process of Karabakh conflict resolution ignoring their legal rights leads to nowhere.
The aggressive policy of Azerbaijan had manifested itself not only in severe repressive actions taken against the citizens it clamed its own, the Armenian inhabitants, but also in failing to take the necessary course of legal actions that could have contained the escalation of Karabakh conflict to open military confrontation. Rather than opting for a productive engagement with NKR aimed at putting the conflict resolution issue on a constructive track, right after the Declaration of its independence on August 30, 1991, which was followed by an adequate, both in political and legal sense, Declaration of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on September 2, 1991, Azerbaijan confidently adopted the course of maximal conflict escalation. Azerbaijan could have resorted to legal means of resolving the conflict, for instance, by conducting a referendum on its territory regarding the future status of Nagorno Karabakh. Instead, it unleashed a bloody war with the NKR. Irrespective of what is spoken in Azerbaijan regarding the recognition of its independence by the international community within the boundaries of Azerbaijani SSR, it has started the war with NKR long before it. Indeed, the conflict in Karabakh began long before Azerbaijan, as such, was recognized by the international community. What this also implies, however, is that the recognition of Azerbaijan in the borders of former Azerbaijani SSR places one in an awkward position. It turns out that the internationally recognized borders of a state are rejected by that very state itself, taking into account that the Republic of Azerbaijan is not the successor of the Azerbaijani SSR, which has waged a bloody war with another state entity on the territory of the former Soviet Azerbaijan.
It is also necessary to draw attention to the following legal aspect that has manifested itself at a time of declaration of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as equal state entities in the territory of former Azerbaijan SSR. Unlike Azerbaijan which, at a time of declaration of its independence rejected the legacy of Azerbaijani SSR and considered itself the legal successor of Azerbaijani Democratic Republic existing in 1918-20, the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh adopted the Declaration of NKR on September 2, 1991, without withdrawing from the USSR legal regulations, let alone the USSR itself that continued its de jure existence by then. On January 6, 1992 the democratically elected Supreme Council of the NKR (parliament of the republic) adopted the Declaration “On State Independence of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” on the basis of popular will of the NKR expressed through a republic-wide referendum held on December 10, 1991.
Against this background of purely legal procedures progressively pursued by the NKR en route to democratic state independence, Azerbaijan declared its independence with reference to the Acts passed on August 30 and October 18, 1991, thereby demonstrating the invalidity of the laws of the USSR at a time of its de jure existence. The Republic of Nagorno Karabakh, on the contrary, prior to December 10, the day of referendum on independence or, to be more precise, until it became clear that the USSR ceased to exist, continued to be bound by the laws of a single state. With this in mind, it is far more accurate to regard Azerbaijan, borrowing from its ordinary lexicon, a “separatist entity” on the territory of former Azerbaijani SSR, with its self-declared independence in clear violation of the then applicable legal norms.
– What is the attitude of the Armenian side with respect to discussions about the feasibility of “two communities” arrangement in the case of NKR?
– Initiated by Azerbaijan, the policy of attributing a loose arrangement of “two communities” perspective to the NKR, supported by some countries of the OSCE Minsk Group and influential actors on the sidelines of international mediation efforts, does not hold any critique. Moreover, the right question to be posed in this regard is: Can we talk about “the French community in France” or “the English community in England?”
The Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh are in no way a community; together, they make what the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh is. Whereas those Azerbaijanis who have abandoned their places of residence before 1991 are the Azerbaijani population of Nagorno Karabakh, whose rights and status as national minority in the NKR is guaranteed, provided that they express a voluntary desire to return to their former settlements. Once integrated into the socio-political, socio-economic and cultural life of the NKR and being granted the citizenship of the republic, the Azerbaijani population of Nagorno Karabakh will become an integral part of the NKR population.
Azerbaijan is constantly trying to use every possible means to co-opt “the representatives of the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh” in the negotiation process on par with the elected Armenian representatives of the NKR. At the same time, it strongly opposes the institutionalization of the Karabakh Azerbaijanis in the Azerbaijani political landscape. This policy, in fact, replicates the classic Turkish experience of dealing with the Cyprus issue. Long before 1974 (year marking the Turkish military intrusion into the northern Cyprus, followed by the declaration of independence in 1983 and its subsequent recognition by Turkey), Turkey has constantly pushed for “two communities” arrangement of the Cyprus and continues to do so, notwithstanding the resentment to any expression of independence on the part of Turkish Cypriots. Year 1974 is referred to for yet another reason as well. Backed by Azerbaijan, the need for initiating a dialogue between “the two communities of Nagorno-Karabakh” has strengthened the false impression among the mediators that this can occur after the transfer all or part of the territories currently controlled by NKR to Azerbaijan and the return of Azerbaijanis to Nagorno Karabakh.
The slogan of “One Nation, Two States” that Turkey and Azerbaijan fervently embrace (and consistently implement it), and deny with no less zeal, when it comes to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh respectively, has become somewhat commonplace and, as the practice reveals, a weak argument on the part of Armenia vis-à-vis the major external actors in the Karabakh conflict settlement. If the latter got used to it, it will do well to remember that starting with 1974, Turkey has persistently refused to withdraw its troops from the Northern Cyprus, nor has the withdrawal of troops, as such, been put forward as a precondition for initiating a necessary dialogue between the Greek and Turkish communities of the island. This will probably assist mediators to cultivate a better understanding of the issue.
It is common knowledge that the so-called “Annan Plan” (initiative of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan) rejected in April 2004 referendum by the Greek Cypriots, envisaged the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal state instead of a unified Republic of Cyprus, which the Greeks perceived as de facto recognition of the Turkish occupation. Consistent with the Annan Plan, Turkey secured the right of maintaining its military presence on the island as well as obtained the legal authorization of previous agreements concluded between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey which, inter alia, enabled the Turkish army to use all the ports, make free movement and fly the Turkish military aircraft over the entire territory of Cyprus.
To start a necessary dialogue between “the Armenian people and the Azerbaijani population of Nagorno Karabakh” as the first step toward the integration of Azerbaijanis into the political landscape of Nagorno-Karabakh, the latter is not obliged to withdraw its troops from the controlled territories thereby transforming the status quo situation established over the past 15 years. Moreover, the withdrawal of the troops and the ensuing transformation of status quo in the zone of Karabakh conflict will create a situation of absolutely no help for constructive engagement.
The outcome will be a situation resembling the “war of all against all” with new dividing lines of military nature being instituted throughout the Karabakh conflict zone and provoking the confrontation of all South Caucasian republics and the neighboring states.
– What are the prospects for the involvement of NKR in international programs and initiatives in the South Caucasus?
– State-building process in the NKR incorporates the principles of democracy, rule of law, respect for and protection of human rights and freedoms.
A number of examples based on the assessments of international observers and human rights organizations confirm that the democratization processes in the NKR are more profound and advanced in comparison with those unfolding in Azerbaijan. Among the recent events substantiating this trend is the fact and results of the referendum on constitutional amendments of March 18, 2009 held in Azerbaijan. In particular, one of the underlying provisions of the amendment, i.e. the reason behind the conduct of the referendum itself envisages the indefinite extension of the President’s tenure.
Against this backdrop of a charade designed to mask the introduction of hereditary rule in the country and “legitimize” the overt usurpation of power, the last presidential elections of 2007 in Nagorno Karabakh seem far beyond the reach of Azerbaijan. As a matter of fact, the previous President of the NKR had a lot more reasons to secure the continuation of his duties as the head of the state for somewhat longer, could he but question the values and principles of democracy.
It is apparent that with current manifestation of a “democratic” tradition ingrained in the Azerbaijani statehood, Azerbaijan is compelled to exert every effort to win the support of the political and public forces of the NKR and prove its real commitment to democratic principles. The people of NKR cannot imagine themselves under the ruleship and subordination of a state, the head of which alters the Constitution of the republic at whim to “legitimize” the extension of his tenure for indefinite time.
There are also numerous examples demonstrating that the international community has become more careful and consistent in considering the perspective of the NKR involvement in the humanitarian and economic projects of the South Caucasus. It is particularly telling that this mood, shared particularly among Europeans, is transmitted to such a close partner of Azerbaijan as Turkey, which is often enforced to take disadvantageous steps in diplomacy to satisfy the vagaries of the “little brother.” Indeed, some Turkish experts have recently taken more objective position at the economic and political realities of the region, which leads them, for example, to understand the existence of the de facto statehood of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and its ability to build a viable economy.
The Republic of Nagorno Karabakh is firmly determined to pursue constructive engagement and participation in international programs and initiatives. The initiatives of the NKR with respect to its international socialization will be of complex nature and, among other things, involve setting the foundations for multilateral cooperation in the region, including Azerbaijan, as a constituent part. In this context, the involvement of the NKR in the multilateral initiative of the European Union – the Eastern Partnership – will be a positive development.
Scheduled for implementation in 2009, the framework of the Eastern Partnership initiative does envisage such multilateral cooperation (thematic platform for multilateral cooperation) in the form of “people to people contacts.” The thematic platform also provides for the “interaction between EU and partner countries’ citizens” built on the principles of intercultural dialogue. In addition, it envisages the involvement of civil society organizations in different areas contributing to the implementation of the program as well as the establishment of an EaP Civil Society Forum.
The NKR can come up with its own initiative appealing to the European Commission as an organization directly engaged in the development and implementation of the Eastern Partnership program to extend the reach of principles and policy prescriptions envisaged in thematic platforms (people to people contacts and cooperation among civil society organizations) for the establishment and development of relations between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh.
At present, the scope of programs endorsed by the Eastern Partnership initiative does not foresee the involvement of the NKR. The research studies conducted by the Institute of Political Studies (IPR) in late 2008 and early 2009 in France, Belgium and Germany have clearly revealed that the participation of the NKR in European initiatives of this nature is strongly blocked by Azerbaijan. Notwithstanding the interest and willingness shown on the part of the EU officials regarding the involvement of NKR in Eastern Partnership initiative, the latter were quick to point to Azerbaijan’s resistance to it. Furthermore, the official representatives of the European Commission and the EU Council of Ministers alike also admitted the feasibility of promoting (as the first step toward the extension of the European initiatives to the NKR) “people to people contacts” and cooperation among civil society organizations. This being the case, the initiative of the NKR to establish contacts and promote civic cooperation with Azerbaijan under the auspices of the Eastern Partnership program stands the high chance of meeting the advocacy of the influential European structures.
The proposal can be implemented under the auspices of the Eastern Partnership program, drawing on the resources of the inter-parliamentary cooperation and those ensuing from cooperation at the regional and local levels. The establishment of South Caucasus Local and Regional Assembly, as envisaged by the Eastern Partnership initiative, can be of further contribution to it (paragraph 4.4 of the Eastern Partnership).
– What should Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh do next at the present stage of Karabakh conflict resolution process?
– The question posed is easy to answer: “be ready for the situation of “Neither War Nor Peace” in the years to come.
We do not know how long it will last – 5, 10, or 15 years? What we do know, however, is that it will. It is therefore necessary to make the best use of these years contributing to peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict and securing regional stability.
Armenia should focus on the process of NKR international recognition in its present borders, consolidate the public and political forces of the homeland by cultivating a unitary position on Karabakh conflict resolution issue as well as encourage the participation of NKR in the European and international multilateral cooperation programs.
The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is “doomed” to continue the process of state-building, encourage sustainable population growth throughout the entire territory of its current boundaries and develop effective infrastructure. NKR must resume its place at the negotiating table. That alone can render constructive spirit to the conflict resolution process and help resolve it.
The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh should stay alert to any development in the conflict area, including the most pessimistic scenarios eventuating in the resumption of hostilities. This is the special “Cross” that Nagorno Karabakh bears from the very beginning of its state-building process.