What Is Your Reaction to President Medvedev’s Decision to Recognize South Ossetia And Abkhazia?

06/09/2008

I believe that unless we diagnose the situation correctly, we won’t know how to react and how to position ourselves. This is not about Abkhazia or S. Ossetia.

It’s about Russia and the US, Russia and Europe. It’s about spheres of influence. What happened yesterday is a small segment of a much larger and potentially catastrophic global confrontation. That is the issue that needs to be urgently and correctly addressed.

As for the decision itself, I think President Medvedev’s quick signature came as a surprise to everybody. Even the Russian pundits close to the Kremlin were not expecting this. The thinking seemed to be that the Duma decision to recommend recognition would be held as a sword over everyone’s heads, to strengthen Russia’s hand with the West generally. But obviously, the Kremlin had its own calculations. That could be tit-for-tat for Kosovo, it could simply be to make the point that Russia is the master in this region, that Russia will not be taught lessons, it could be this is additional pressure to make Saakashvili go. Or none of the above. Or all of the above. It’s difficult to speculate, but it’s much easier to see the consequences. This will more than complicate the situation between Russia and the West – something that is absolutely not needed now in a world with plenty of other pressing economic and security problems. It goes without saying it will complicate the situation for all of us in this region – for Armenia and Azerbaijan and Turkey.

How Will This Affect The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict Resolution Process?

Armenians’ negotiating position need not be changed, but ought to be even more clearly and loudly articulated and reinforced than ever.

Armenia has to make clear very quickly that the only reason Armenia has not thus far recognized Nagorno Karabakh’s independence or asked others to is because at core of the ongoing negotiations is the issue of the self-determination of the people of Nagorno Karabakh. 

If this process fails, Armenia should make clear that it will have no choice but to recognize Nagorno Karabakh.

What the military and political conflict of the last two weeks brought to the fore is this: One, that  the issue of use of force to resolve ethnic conflicts is unacceptable. Second, a country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have become an even greater focus of attention. This newly emerged situation is a double-edged sword for Nagorno Karabakh because on the one hand, there will be far less tolerance for military rhetoric and military action. On the other hand, we should expect a toughening of the line on self-determination issues by the international community. Still, just as we’ve said all along, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is not like any other conflict. It has evolved down its own path. Our right to self-determination is founded not just on legal, historical and political foundations, but also on the fact that Azerbaijan has repeatedly used force to impose its jurisdiction on the people of Nagorno Karabakh. We will continue to defend their rights.

Who Do You Believe Was Responsible For The Way This Situation Evolved?

If I allowed myself to be cynical, I would say Stalin. For two reasons: He was Georgian, and at the same time he was leader of the great Soviet Union where his first job was to pursue Russian interests, and by creating an ethnic jigsaw puzzle, he believed he was.  Thus, for today’s situation, ultimately Stalin, the “Russian” Georgian, is responsible.

But really, I’ve tried to find an answer to your question myself. Like so many of us, I’ve followed the events closely, getting my information from five different television channels in five different languages. The coverage, depending on where it originated, differs dramatically. On top of this, there are the statements, charges, countercharges, by high officials from countries directly and indirectly involved, as well as from interested parties, and the picture becomes even more complicated. 

However, based on recent history, my experience, and what we’ve learned, my take is that there was provocation from the S. Ossetian side to which Georgia overreacted and to that overreaction, Russia, too, overreacted. Thus a double overreaction brought us to today’s physical and political carnage.

But provocation has been the pattern in this conflict for so long. Therefore those overreactions can only be explained by deep-seated and accumulated hostility, resentment and hatred, or by cold-blooded strategic geopolitical calculations, or both.

Do You Think Tbilisi Would Have Taken This Action Without The Knowledge Of The Us?

History is full of instances of mixed messages. The first Gulf War is such an example. So, in the context of Washington’s unreserved political, economic and particularly military assistance, it’s possible to see how Georgian leaders could come to a similar assumption.

I personally do not believe that Washington would have approved such actions.

Why Didn’t The Us Offer Military Assistance To Its Military Ally?

To expect that the US would have provided military assistance in such a situation – in this place, under these circumstances – would be naïve. I think Georgia could not realistically have had such expectations either.  Of course for the US, Georgia’s democracy and sovereignty and Georgia-related energy security issues are all important. But there are other critical issues that require US-Russia cooperation and so the US would have had to gauge these two sets of interests. Clearly any direct military intervention in this region would upset that balancing act and would indeed have been catastrophic.  

What Can Yerevan Do That It Hasn’t Done?

There is a difference between being neutral and not taking sides. We can be neutral about something that goes on in Africa or South America. But in our own immediate neighborhood, we can’t be neutral and not have an opinion. We can and must be non-partisan, however.  I introduced this difference to make a point – regardless of the terminology used to describe it, what Armenia did during this crisis was understandable. My own preference would have been to be more actively engaged and plainly demonstrate non-partisanship.

For example, I would have wanted to see our president go from Beijing to Moscow and Tbilisi and return to Yerevan in the first days of that conflict, with clear messages to all that that which is happening is not in anyone’s interest. It’s true of course that such self-styled mediation would not have a huge effect in reducing tensions or bringing about solutions, but its meaning would not have been lost on anyone, and Armenia would have demonstrated its real, unmistakably non-partisan position on the events themselves and on that which could come as a consequences of these events. In other words, Armenia would have clearly said to all that it is not going to choose between friends, that if Russia is our strategic partner, Georgia is our natural partner. Both are of existential importance to us.  If in the past we used the policy of complementarity to maintain and nurture relations with both the West and Russia, now the situation is at our door and that need is even more acute. Now, we must use enhanced complementarity, more audacious and blunt, to openly and actively promote relations with all. We have no other choice. Choosing is not a choice.

Will Russia’s Role In The Region Change?

Of course. This region will not be the same. The roles, the lessons, the perceptions of each participant about the other will come to a head and will be very complicated.

However, history shows that even when circumstances reach this kind of strained situation, the right steps at the right time can in fact bring us to positive disentanglement. This is that time. A non-use of force philosophy that turns into a commitment and becomes the focus of all future actions will free us to resolve political problems, and not simply deal with security fears. We can build a Caucasus stability pact and then move on to resolve the more complex issues.

It is the political relationship that will be evolving between Russia and the West that is of utmost concern to us. This relationship has been badly damaged. The scars that are sure to remain will make future cooperation or collaboration even more complicated. Worse, there is the fear that there may be a return to Cold War partisanship. Even after the honeymoon ended, Russia-West relations remained respectful. To say that the disappearance of such a tolerant environment will adversely affect Armenia and the region is a great understatement.

East-West tensions will be reflected in the Georgia-Russia relationship, by proxy. That means Armenia will have to not just adhere to its policy of complementarity, but as I said, will have to practice enhanced, more audacious complementarity in order to assure our own, unique role in this new configuration.

In The Herald Tribune, You Built On The Turkish Suggestion To Propose A New Vision For The Region

This truly is the Caucasus moment. It’s a historic opportunity, it can be a wise moment, or as I said an ominous moment. The political and military crisis is so deep that in the context of a new regional security pact, we can seriously talk about non-alignment.

The proposal to review the security in the S. Caucasus should be viewed in its proper context. If all interested and involved parties, all of them, agree to an unbreakable stability pact which would have at its core a commitment to non-use of force, then it would be possible to look at the issues otherwise. That means that at the highest levels, Moscow, Washington and Brussels would have to work with Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan to create a non-aligned Caucasus, with no memberships in opposing or exclusive security arrangements, a Caucasus that is not neutral, but is non-partisan.

I understand that this is a very complex idea, tantamount to establishing a new regional order, but why not? What I’m suggesting clearly requires political will, and a commitment to the articulated vision, gauging interests in the long-term, going beyond narrow immediate gains. It also requires overcoming deep-seated animosities, resentments and security fears. A hard and comprehensive security pact can address that and open the way for considering this bigger change.

That is possible today, because we have all been put on alert by what happened. What awaits us can be a much more dangerous and explosive situation.