– Mr. Bagratyan, the Karabagh issue, which became a reason for change of government years ago, seems to be left in the past at the present. The political parties preparing for the coming elections don’t even mention the resolution of Karabagh. How do you explain this?
– In the summer, the American co-chairman of the Minsk Group, Mathew Bryza, mentioned the main provisions of the so-called “circular” way of solving the conflict. If you remember the RA Foreign Minister said that if Azerbaijan accepts those provisions, we will as well and will persuade the people to follow them. So it’s no accident that the political parties, which are preparing for elections, are not speaking much about the Karabagh conflict resolution. It is evident that progress in that issue is much suspicious. On one hand they don’t mention the conflict because they don’t want to give fake promises and deteriorate their relations with the current government. On the other hand they don’t dare to speak about it because they well realize that in 1998 it was connected with change of government and as a result comprehend that the document prepared now is no better than the one proposed eight years ago – one in 1993, the other one in 1997. This is the problem.
– You mentioned some draft on resolution of the conflict prepared in 1993. Which one is that?
– I know three types of resolution of the conflict. In 1993, when we already had the victory in our hands and Azerbaijan was shocked as it was expecting that the international community would negatively react to the victory of Armenia, the November recommendation was originated. Azerbaijan hadn’t yet adopted a Constitution and was trying to make us understand that it will agree with the confederation option. This issue was even discussed in Moscow. Armenia didn’t discuss it thinking it’s unacceptable for the winning side.
– In your opinion what’s been the evolution of the conflict since the November 1993 recommendation?
– In 1994-96 we started to feel that the rest of the world is more inclined to respect the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. This principle was weighing higher compared to the determination principle. Later there was the 1997 stage-by-stage version, which caused government change in RA. The main locomotive of the change of government was that in parallel to receding occupied territories we should have also raised the status issue. Later we had the “Key West” and then the “circular” solutions, which in my opinion didn’t bring any progress to Armenia. In order to be subjective let me also mention that according to the document proposed by Bryza, Karabagh is allowed to conduct a referendum but it doesn’t say how and when. The terms of the referendum, according to the same source, must be consented with Azerbaijan. They propagate a lot that this referendum will bring independence to Karabagh. I wouldn’t be very encouraged about this version of solution because I think it is the same stage-b-stage option, proposed in 1997. Unlike 1997, NKR is not mentioned as a negotiator. In 1997 the international community was giving greater warranties. Nevertheless, the reason why I’m saying this is not to prove that this option or the other one is better or worse. It seems that this referendum is also more like covering up because after that dozens of years will pass and they will tell us to wait a little more for the referendum. This is possible. The important thing is that right now we have the stage-by-stage but not the package version. It’s obvious that time is not on our side. Armenia had to sign different documents on territorial integrity (including Azerbaijan’s) several times. And Azerbaijan doesn’t show any willingness to negotiate and gradually starts to speak even more about solving the issues through military operations. Therefore, it’s obvious that the negotiations after 1993 have deteriorated even more. But why?
– However, it seems that the Armenian side isn’t quite interested in solving this conflict now.
– I think it’s important to differentiate the profit of Armenia and Azerbaijan in terms of prolonging the resolution process. Azerbaijan in fact really makes its attitude rougher. Armenia doesn’t because it has certain use in providing cease fire because of Azerbaijan’s rough policy. We are lucky. We announced that Azerbaijan doesn’t want it and meanwhile said that if it does we will convince our people. Convince what? The RA Foreign Minister has already mentioned what we should convince our people. And you witnessed the reaction of the National Assembly. That is, under circumstances Azerbaijan is helping us but we perfectly know that it’s going to end some day. They delay the resolution in order to resume it once they are much stronger than us. We don’t want to clarify anything. Aliyev Junior build its foreign policy on the following postulates: a) in the course of time Armenians will be weaker than them, b) their alliance is constantly expanding in the international community, which is not the same for Armenians, c) get Karabagh back without making serious compromises to the West and Russia. We expressed our opinion about the last draft proposed by Bryza and Azerbaijan makes its policy even rougher. So this time prolongation is only good for Armenia temporarily. Later it will harm us. Now our authorities, who have little means to withstand any attacks have nothing to hope for. This prolongation only helps the Armenian side not to stumble. But they don’t see the light on the other side of the tunnel. We should really worry about the fact why Azerbaijan is so courageous.
– Perhaps it’s reasoned purely on the economic development of Azerbaijan.
– Indeed, the figures of the economic growth of Azerbaijan are impressive. In parallel to the impressive economic growth figures – 30-40%, Azerbaijan also conducts constructive reforms. For example, in 1996 Azerbaijan was several times back compared to the pensions paid in Armenia. Now it is ahead of Armenia in all sectors. Of course Aliyev hopes that this kind of economic development will strengthen the military potential of the country, as well as solve the Karabagh conflict through military means. But that is not the substantial element. Aliyev perfectly understands that no matter how long it takes to solve the conflicts – 10-15 years, time is on Azerbaijan’s side. Why? Because Azerbaijan is developing. Isn’t Armenia developing? Armenia develops much slower than Azerbaijan. There are serious problems for development of Armenia. It is not only the economic issues. There are other factors as well. Armenia wasn’t able to move this historical conflict on its side. After 1993, time has never worked on Armenians’ side. I strongly believe that the Armenian society must make a decision. It either has to make serious compromises regarding the Karabagh territories or doesn’t compromise and meanwhile doesn’t prolong time. Instead our society must establish new institutes and conduct the right course of policy. If we had such institutes now perhaps the Azeri would rush to solve the conflict. We should have created factors, which in the aspect of Azerbaijan would jeopardize its opportunity to have Karabagh back. Karabagh conflict is not only about demonstrating economic growth or armies. Of course the army is one of the mentioned institutes. I wouldn’t like to underestimate what has been done in the Armenian army. However the Armenians don’t have any means to essentially revolutionize the army. Azerbaijan thinks that by politically isolating Armenia and developing economically, it will have better chances to fortify its army several times. Perhaps they are covertly planning some conspiracy with Turkey. We have a situation now which we didn’t have in 1995 or 1998 – the Armenian-Turkish collision.
– Is it possible to create the factors, which you mentioned? If yes, then what are those?
– In 1994, we were thinking the following: since they were two principal issues to be solved within the conflict (territorial integrity and determination of nations) and as a result the two issues collided each other and we were not able to convince the international community of the opposite, we decided that we should bring more people to those territories and move the issue to the humanitarian level as well. Those territories are not only historically ours but are essentially important for us. A day ago I watched one Armenian from Brussels, saying, “I am from Athens. I came here to protect the Armenian cause.” I think the best way to protect the Armenian cause is not to go from Athens to Brussels. It would be much better if these people moved to live here, in the so-called “occupied territories” of Karabagh. Meanwhile, if you remember last year the Council of Europe sent a monitoring group. We were proudly telling everyone about the people residing in Karabagh. This means if people don’t live in that territory, then this means that they don’t consider that territory their homeland. The word homeland has a historical meaning for us. For Turks the homeland is where the Turk currently lives. We finally realized that the number one factor for geopolitics is demography. All the other factors like language, culture, nation and others are less meaningful in terms of demographic importance. There is no need to seek reasons why the US, Russia or some other country doesn’t increase its support level to Armenians. There is no need to hope that if Kosovo issue is solved Karabagh conflict will also be solved. In our case history taught us not to wait for standards. It’s just pity that in 1994-1995 we were able to have a higher number of people living in Karabagh than we do now. Don’t think that we have any key in our hands. We can create such things. In the course of time it may become a more serious factor than the obstacle of territorial integrity. But unfortunately such institutes are not established in Armenia. In our country the Karabagh conflict has been reviewed as an issue between 2-3 people. But the conflict resolution is not an issue for people. It’s an issue that is to be solved through institutes. We don’t resist the institutes of Azerbaijan with our institutes. We demonstrate and rally a lot to show the real face of Turks or Azeri. Perhaps it’s a good method but we haven’t tried to send people to Karabagh to live, mainly to the occupied territories. Aliyev knows what our weaknesses are. That’s why he’s not rushing.
to be continued