According to “Regnum”, the RA Civil Aviation Central Board (CACB) has sent a package of corrections in the text of the final conclusions made for the International Aviation Committee (IAC) concerning the investigation of the Armenian A 320 jet that crashed in the Black Sea on May 3.
The document consists of three parts: main, editorial and principal corrections. The main part writes that the weather radar of Sochi airport did not display dangerous weather conditions and that IAC makes its conclusions based on pilots’ conversations concerning the weather conditions. The CACB suggests analyzing the parameter and analysis information of the aircraft radar and thus finding out the reasons of the pilots’ conversations, as well as give estimations on the working conditions and level of the Sochi airport radars.
The next correction states that at the “Armavia” company, the flight analysis of A 320 aircrafts hasn’t been done objectively, due to which they were not able to make further estimations on the professional level of the pilots. The CACB suggests taking that point out since “supervising does not matter when it comes time to estimate the professional qualification level of pilots”.
The CACB also suggests taking out the following part: “The conversations in the cabin show that the situation in the cabin was getting worse. The crew members (especially the captain) were trying to land particularly in the Sochi airport. The following conversation proves that that crew did not want to disturb the air navigation officer of approaching point of the Sochi airport for not having received the information about weather conditions.” Besides that, the CACB suggests taking out the following ending of a sentence: “…or was confused and had psychological problems due to commanding the arrival of the plane at the Sochi airport urgently.”
The next correction of the CACB concerns the point that “the air navigation officer gave those instructions in accordance with his working duties, after losing his contact with the crew members”. The CACB writes that “in fact, they made estimations about the air navigation activities after losing connection, nevertheless, they didn’t state the estimations of the air navigations concerning the altitude: in the second round turn before crashing the water and the requirements of HNN -85 6.5.8., the system and flight line”. Concerning this, the CACB suggests estimating the work of air navigation in that part of the flight and adds the following: “However, it didn’t have a direct influence on what happened to the flight”. In addition, the CACB suggests writing the 10th points in the following manner: “The weather conditions and air navigation handling don’t always comply with the requirements of the existing documentation”. As a principal correction, the CACB writes that they hadn’t discussed a version, according to which the pilot might have lost control before the catastrophe. They suggested including the version that the pilot might have been out of control before the catastrophe.