During the G8 summit in Deauville on May 26 the announcement of the presidents of Minsk Group countries was accepted with fast reaction both in Armenia and Azerbaijan. As it was one year ago, this time Yerevan and Baku tried to blame each other in failing the negotiation process and present the announcement as a positive document for their PR purposes. Unfortunately the Armenian opposition reacted to it with ignorance and insisted that the announcement was unprecedented as for the first time it specified terms for coming to agreement upon the main principles till the planned meeting in Kazan in June, which means that the process is going faster. However, on June 26, 2010, the announcement of Muskoka the presidents of the US, Russia and France gave a shorter term to the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan till the meeting of the OSCE minister in Almaty on July 17. At that time they gave 20 days to overcome the main difficulties and agree upon the main principles for the purpose of starting the work on peace agreement. It is clear that the purpose of the announcements of political circles was campaigning for their positions. In order to reveal the real goals and purposes of the announcement, it is important to take into consideration also the previous announcements of Medvedev, Sarkozy and Obama, as well as the announcements before Deauville.
Preliminary developments
Recently the discussions for the regulation of the issue has been proceeding in two significant areas, i.e. creation of routes to transfer energy generating substance to Europe and clearing up the deadlines of establishment of the Russian military bases and the relations with military alliances. Energy generating substances for Europe. The competition between two alternative projects – the Russian “South stream” and European Nabucco lies in the bases of the issue concerning the transfer of the energy generating substances. It is worth mentioning the observation made by the expert of American “Heritage” foundation A.Koen. “Europe doesn’t need two big gas pipe lines “South stream” and Nabucco at the same time”. “Nabucco” the main purpose of which is the significant decrease of dependence from Russian gas, has a serious shortcoming. It cannot provide the necessary amount of gas (30 milliard cubic meter). It was anticipated that the necessary amount could be received from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq, however even after the exploitation of the second turn of “Shah Deniz” Baku is able to provide only 10 milliard cubic meter of gas. The transfer of gas from Iraq is impossible in the near future taking into account the situation in the country. What concerns Turkmenistan, which has unlimited gas reserves, it has to solve difficult political and technical issues. The “South stream,” which is more powerful than “Nabucco” has no reserve issues, however Russia has to achieve successful completion of “trade” with Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. One of the main purposes of “South Stream” is to be released from the dependence of the Ukraine on the way of transferring the gas to Europe, as a result of which “gas crisis” will still last long in Europe. Moscow chose the Black Sea route to pass round the Ukraine. In spite of the fact that Ankara gave preliminary agreement during Putin’s visit, during his visit to Moscow in March Erdoghan stated that there are a number of obstacles. It is obvious that being involved in “Nabucco” as well Turkey tries to sell its transit possibilities as expensive as possible. Ankara and Baku have active interest and role in the competition of the two projects, the former as key point in both cases and the latter as the country exporting energy generating substances. Of course Turkey cannot present many demand to Turkey, as it depends on the provision of Russian energy generating substances and it may be supposed that after the Parliamentary elections Turkey will give agreement to the construction underwater pipe line “South stream” through the Black Sea. It was never a secret that the orientation of Baku in terms of competition of two gas projects depended on its expectations of Kharabakh conflict regulation. Particularly at the beginning of the year the head of Azerbaijan’s gas research center I. Shaban hesitated, “Why should Baku ensure the energetic security of Europe, if the official Brussels does nothing to protect the territorial completion of Azerbaijan, and has never even recognize Armenia as an aggressor.” But Azerbaijan should have realized that even if European Union formed its attitude towards the Southern Caucasus exclusively from the point of view of import of energy generating substances, then its possibilities to provide only one third of gas for “Nabucco” would not be sufficient to resolve such an issue. This led to Azerbaijan’s disappointment from Europe and significant changes in the foreign politics. First of all, Baku reviewed its approach concerning the provision gas to Turkey by Baku-Tbilisi- Erzerum gas pipe line, which was functioning since 2008. From now on Turkey will not have a chance to resell Azerbaijan’s gas. Turkey will gain incomes as a transit country, and the price negotiations will be conducted by Baku and not by Ankara. At the same time, Azerbaijan postponed the concluding of the new gas agreement with Turkey, by which the gas amount of “Shah Deniz-2” expected by Turkey will obtain legal power. Later, at the end of May the head of state oil company R. Abdulov announced that “Azerbaijan can transfer its gas to Europe not by “Nabucco” project but by other more profitable routes.” R. Musambekov, politician, deputy of Mili Mejlis, thinks that “Europeans continuously urge Azerbaijan to join “Nabucco” project but we won’t do it by all means just for pleasing Europe. If European Union stays aside from helping Azerbaijan with Kharabakh issue, then, respectively, it can’t expect Baku’s support in providing Europe with energy security”. Baku actually reconsiders its relations both with the countries of European Union and Turkey in the sphere of export of energy-generating substance not being pleased with the process of Nagorno Kharabakh conflict regulation. But these revisions have a broader comprehensiveness and are not limited just by energy-generating substances.
Army political sphere. In this sphere as a start of essential progress can be regarded August 2010 when Russia’s president Medvedev visited Yerevan and an agreement was signed to prolong the deadline of the Russian military base located in Gyumri until 2046 and it was ratified in the spring of 2011. The only nuance was that there were still 12 years before the expiration of the deadline stipulated by the current agreement. Armenian authorities didn’t give any explanation concerning this haste except the statement that Moscow would support Armenia in conformity with the new agreement if Kharabakh conflict restarts though according to Russia’s minister of foreign affairs S. Lavrov in conformity with the new agreement “the deadline of Russian military base in Armenia is prolonged. Nothing more. It changes neither the functions of Russian military base in Armenia, nor the number of the servicemen and nor the amount of weapons in that military base. That’s why it’s senseless to speak about any change that the agreement can incorporate into the balance of forces in the region”. It’s obvious that the new agreement considerably strengthened Russia’s position in the region at the same time essentially reducing Armenia’s maneuvering opportunities in its relations with countries pursuing geopolitical interests in South Caucasus, firstly Russia and United States. Though Moscow didn’t respond to Armenia’s expectations in any way concerning its role in case the war restarts, probably Armenia’s authorities sincerely believed the realization of those expectations. Perhaps this was the reason why in May 2011 there had been made a public attempt to connect those expectations with Collective Security Pact member countries. Firstly, in the interview with “Moskovskiye Novosti” president Sargsyan stated: “Russia is our ally in Collective Security Pact Organization. And in case of a serious threat to our security or restarting military operations Russia has both obligation and opportunity to respond”, then referring to Collective Security Pact, added: “We cooperate actively and with conviction within the frames of CSP. There are all the legal bases for CSP members to cooperate. There is such a conviction”. A few days later S. Ohanyan, the minister of defense, formulated the expectations more clearly during the conference on topic “Collective Security Pact Organization and South Caucasus”. “During the war in 1992-94 Armenia solved the problem of defense of Nagorno Kharabakh itself but the situation has considerably changed today, and taking into consideration CSP membership, we think that we have the right to expect the response and support of our allies within the frames of the organization which firstly have certain responsibilities to one another and, secondly, concrete opportunities to respond to the possible aggression”. The responses of CSP member countries weren’t late and they excluded the interference of those countries in case of the restart of war in Kharabakh. Moreover the scientific worker of Strategic research institute adjunct to the president of Kazakhstan, Lamiulin, stated: “If a conflict arises in Nagorno Kharabakh it won’t mean that Azerbaijan attacked Armenia but it will be Azerbaijan’s internal problem as Nagorno Kharabakh is a part of Azerbaijan’s territory.” Russian sources recall that CSP member states didn’t even support Russia in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is hard to say why they have involved the defense minister in foreign political matters but the circumstances make us understand that in the event of resumption of Karabakh war it will be hard to believe in the idea of support on part of Russia and CSP states. This kind of hope and loud statement on that reduces the reputation of the Armenian army. “During 1992-1994 war Armenia itself resolved the defense issues of Karabakh but today the situation is drastically changed…” This expression may be apprehended as lack of confidence in our own might and might damage the situation. The respect of the international experts towards the twin armies of Armenia has been gained due to immense efforts, great damage, deprivation and it shouldn’t be damaged due to political adventurousness. Almost simultaneously but with a different logic in Azerbaijan similar events were taking place. In May they started the Russian-Azerbaijani negotiations around the lease of Gabala radio location station. That is a station where about 1400 Russian soldiers serve. They control a territory with the area of 6000 km radius – from Africa till Australia and can simultaneously control 20 people and in 100 separate check points. It is noteworthy that in this case the deadline of the acting agreement expires in 2012 and the negotiations around the development of a new contract are still pending and started only a year ago only after the ratification of the Armenian-Russian agreement. Baku has submitted to Russia a more favorable condition but most importantly the singing of the agreement will put a new accent to the relations between Azerbaijan, Russia and the West. It also includes the joining of Azerbaijan to the movement of non-unified states (NUS) that took place at the end of May. This step was so unexpected that the Russian experts called it a radical change of Azerbaijani’s foreign policy. They meant the fact that the charter adopted in 2007 on National Security Baku has prioritized the membership to Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO’s ‘open door’ rhetoric towards enlargement means that any European state can join the Alliance if it is ready to comply with the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. This notion logically implies the possibility that Russia will eventually become a member of the Alliance. However, the history of the Cold War and the reason NATO was founded, makes Russia a special case, thus the NATO ‘open door’ rhetoric is not so straight forward. Even if NATO does not exclude the possibility of Russian membership and states that the country is eligible to apply, Moscow does not show any desire to join the Alliance. Nevertheless, Moscow has on several occasions raised the possibility of membership; however it was more a case of diplomatic maneuvering than a serious attempt to become a member. So, NATO’s door is not closed, but neither side has made a genuine effort to open it.
Deauville-Kazan-Zurich-2
By taking certain drastic steps in May 2011 Azerbaijan moved to the north by probably assuming, according to political scientist R. Musabekov, that it is still Russia that has any power to bring the conflicting sides to compromises. At the first sight, basis of such an assumption may serve the immense influence of Russia on Armenia and Medvedev’s active role in the process of regulation of the conflict. Moreover, it seems that the Deauville statement of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group made recently also comes to prove that. According to that statement, on March 5 with the solicitation of the Russian president the version of the main principles discussed in Sochi is a sufficient ground for providing a compromise for both of the sides. In the meantime, the document urges the presidents of Russia and Armenia to demonstrate a political will in June in Kazan and end their efforts of finalizing the main principles. It seems that in the joint statement of the presidents of the co-chair states they at least show appreciation to the efforts of Russia to provide the meeting for the presidents of Armenia and a Russia. Armenia welcomed a statement by the presidents of the US, France and Russia issued Thursday in Deauville, France, in which the leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries urged Armenia and Azerbaijan to finalize the “Basic Principles” of the Karabakh negotiations. On Friday, official Baku pointed fingers at Yerevan for delaying the process. A senior aide to President Ilham Aliyev and the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said Baku shares the sense of urgency of the three mediating powers. They claimed that Thursday’s joint statement by Presidents Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitry Medvedev heightened pressure on Armenia. “It follows from the statement that Armenia must start the withdrawal of its armed forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement cited by Azerbaijani news agencies. “Unfortunately … Armenia continues to drag out that process and thereby impede the conflict’s peaceful resolution,” it said. The president of Armenia has responded [to Azerbaijani accusations that Armenia is dragging its feet on accepting the Madrid principles] by saying that the St Petersburg proposals have not been accepted by Azerbaijan. As far as the updated Madrid principles are concerned, I think it is obvious that they remain only suggestions. This viewpoint is reinforced by the fact that the Muskoka statement of the Minsk Group co-chairs contains the same six provisions that were already stated in the L’Aquila announcement a year ago. It is worth mentioning that publicizing the provisions of a document under negotiation before the end of the negotiating process is an unprecedented phenomenon except in the Karabakh settlement process. This apparently stresses how interested the co-chairing countries are in regulation of the conflict. However, there has been no progress in the past year. What is the reason? I think it is the fact that although the Madrid principles define the international law framework through which the conflict should be solved (although this is not necessary, since the principles are stated in the Helsinki Final Act and fundamental documents of the UN), the intermediaries are not keeping the process on this path and are not specifying concrete steps towards a solution based on these principles. Moreover, the formulations of six steps in these documents and the uncertain announcements that followed served as a basis for further speculation. Of course, it is common practice that in order to ensure their flexibility the intermediaries always try to allow for a margin in discussions, but when this is done unskillfully it results in the reverse effect. The key to ensuring real progress is the clear definition by the intermediaries of the objective, mode and conditions of the exercise of the right to self-determination. The norms of international law say that it is only the people (i.e. the people of Nagorno-Karabakh) that are eligible to exercise the right to decide their status which can be the declaration of an independent state, separation and unification with another state or any other status of people’s choice. Of course, the co-chairs know this perfectly well, but they are also aware that Azerbaijan will never sign any agreement that implies the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. The only solution is, therefore, via the path that was earlier taken by Kosovo. "Nagorno-Karabakh of Azerbaijan surrounding areas to return subordination", and Yerevan, the right to self-determination on the application of the same time, Russia, France and the United States Presidents process "reloading" indicate a possibility to avoid. "When the agreement reached, we are ready to ensure that the principles of formal adoption, support the development of a draft peace agreement and our international partners to support its implementation." This phrase bold part of the whole statement is the most important part, makes sense only if the document, on which should come to an agreement the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, is not publicized. It is obvious that the document accessible to the public need to ensure the existence of absolutely no Because Aliyev and Sargsyan, some issues do not come to an agreement (and cannot come vicious strategy talks result), co-chair the co-chairs of Deauville statement offer closed to agree on the existence of formal reports to ensure their readiness as we know, there is already such an experience. The protocols, which declared the existence of four months after they were kept secret fact suggested the "Zurich-2 action, hoping that the future" draft peace agreement "would be more acceptable to the parties, taking into account the last months of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy changes recorded can be assumed that the Baku understood that the Russian-Georgian August war. After the war the region was an entirely new situation, where success requires serious reviewing, therefore, should not be excluded that Deauville statement Baku accept the plan because "elements of the Basic Principles" is obviously much more profitable for Azerbaijan, said the point of view is very would be dangerous if Kazan is also rapidly Armenia and unconditional support for the proposal well-known co-chairs, which was several times, hoping that Baku will reject it and will appear in the awkward situation, but at the same time, the continuation of the negotiation process is fraught with crisis, another threat as several even happened, the co-chairs the situation can be considered dead-end, the document, unpromising, and started to be quite different based on the principles of drafting a new document. And then no one can guarantee that it will be included in the right of self-determination of the existence of two decades the most important negotiations component, but to prevent it from Armenia is required for a very different quality of foreign policy and diplomatic primitive cunning moves, which are used instead of real work, sooner or later lead to a trap. It remains to hope that at least it will not work in Kazan.
By Tigran Torosyan
PhD of Political Science