The President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev has managed to visit two enemy countries of the region Armenia and Azerbaijan within a short period of time. What did these visits give to our region? To what direction may the NKR conflict resolution develop? This and other questions of the 168-Zham newspaper are answered by the first deputy of the Association of Diplomats of Russia Vladimir Kazimirov, who was the head of the Russian mediation mission in 1992-1996 and the authorized representative of the Russian President on the NKR issues.
– During the recent visit of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Armenia a range of important agreements were signed, which included the prolongation of deployment of the Russian military bases, terms and conditions. Certain southern Caucasus pundits have seen a change of balance of powers in the favor of Armenia. What is your opinion about this point?
– Perhaps because of the tension around thee negation process of the NKR and the threats on part of Baku had made the experts focus a little more on the prolongation of the deployment of the Russian military bases in Armenia and the determination of their functions compared to other agreements and documents. Let me confess that I was really surprised by the difference of this many opinions. For some of them there was nothing new here besides the prolongation of the dates, for others it was just vice versa. And they consider this as violation of the balance of powers. It seems that conflict of interests is a plus but on the other hand this is also a minus because it means that in these estimations there are many subjective elements and sometimes even emotional components are noticed. The joint axis of balanced and objective viewpoints is missing.
– This to a certain extent looks like falling to euphoria from frustration. I would abstain from such radicalism because both of them are destabilizing. This indeed is an important and significant step but the real importance of that will emerge not in near future.
– Azerbaijan by periodically forgetting about the peaceful resolution of the NKR conflict, relating to which he makes statements at high level international events, often uses the language of threats and promises its people to resolve the conflict via military force. Moreover, quite often the truce treaty is being violated. At least the Azerbaijani media claims the daily violations on the border almost on daily basis. In your opinion how serious is the possibility of resumption of war? What should or can Moscow do to reduce risks?
– Self-lie regarding their own forces has become one of the tribal symbols of the Azerbaijani elite. It has been expressed in the tenure of all administrations. The threats of using force are sound violations of Helsinki Act. And this aggressive behavior definitely conduces to creating tension on the borderline by organizing all kinds of diversions and assaults. Moreover, the defense ministry of Azerbaijan has been for many years literally publicizing summaries on the violation of the truce on the border on part of Armenians by pretending that it is concerned and discontented about that. But in that case why doesn’t Baku offer anything to stop violation of truce on the borderline? Moreover, it has been awhile since Baku stopped abiding with the agreement of cease fire made in February 1995. It is also eloquent that Azerbaijan refuses to remove its snipers from the first line. It is hard to give a definite answer about the possibility of resumption of war. Baku would like a blitz-fight but it realizes that it’s almost impossible and it is afraid of the possible aftermath. It is not as much frightened of casualties but the unpleasant political and economical consequences by taking into account the fact that the result of the attack is not clear. Moscow as well as Paris and Washington, as much as I understand, must use political and diplomatic techniques to preclude the threat of war and not only by silent diplomacy. I find the statement of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen made in Almaty very useful, which clearly demonstrates criticism in relation to the bellicose statements and offers to strengthen the regime of cease fire. I haven’t heard approval of this statement on part of Baku.
– Turkey and Iran are periodically trying to interfere in the NKR conflict resolution process. As of Turkey it’s all clear because it is the closest partner of Azerbaijan. In your opinion why does Iran need extra trouble considering the fact that Iran itself is currently in an “unclear” political situation?
– Both Turkey and Iran have participated in the process of searching ways of resolution of the NKR conflict during different periods of time and in different manners. Turkey has originally been in the OSCE Minsk Group but was but was deprived of its more vital role because of its unilateral approaches. Iran was active in 1992 but after the fall of Shushi it reduced its activeness. At any rate the Russian mediation mission was maintaining relations with both Ankara and Tehran during the years of war. It was even suggesting these countries to jointly with Russia make a statement but of them refused. I think that Iran has the need to show its positive role in the region and Turkey is trying to raise its role in the process of the NKR conflict resolution. I think both of the countries may be useful if they clearly state and act on behalf of peaceful resolution of the conflict.
– It’s a long time that you are dealing with the issue of Karabakh. Where should the parties look for the key of the conflict settlement if the two parties of the conflict have drastically contradicting positions to the settlement of the conflict according to your opinion? How can the formula of the conflict settlement be?
– It is clear that at present neither Baku, nor Yerevan and nor Stepanakert can agree with the standpoints of the conflicting parties. That is the reason why this issue should be decided by the people of Karabakh, including the Azeri people who used to live there before the conflict. This will be the most logical solution as the destiny of the people cannot be decided without their participation and the expression of their will cannot be prolonged for more than five years. As I understand the formula of the conflict settlement should be the following: 1) legally establish the responsibilities of the three parties for the purpose of the exclusively peaceful settlement of the conflict, as well as agree the general method of the expression of the people’s will concerning the status of NKR and the interim status as well, 2) take out the armed forces from the territories occupied from each other (besides Kelbajar and Lachin) and return of the refugees in the arm-free liberated lands , and 3) organize a referendum on the status of NKR and liberate the above-mentioned two regions (besides the Lachin corridor). But it is very important that the voters of Karabakh have to vote for all the possible status types but not limited types. It is also important to discuss in parallel the issue of returning the Armenians into their former places of living in Baku, Gyandja, Nakhidjevan and other places, as well as the Azeri people in Armenia (notwithstanding who will agree to return or no). Of course a lot of things depend on the details, which I am not touching upon here.
– Is it possible that if Azerbaijan does not receive satisfactory recommendations during Medvedev’s upcoming visit to Azerbaijan and it may revise the Azeri-Russian relations and drastically change the political direction and look for “more effective” mediators, and make the demands to revise the Minsk Group involvement more intensive?
– I don’t believe these talks because Azerbaijan and Russia are close neighbors and objectively need cooperation in different sectors. Besides that, the Russian president is not leaving for Baku to pass an exam, but to satisfy those “who are taking the exam”. The best thing in the work of mediators is the ability to wait and commitment to the main issue (conflict peaceful settlement), intellectual flexibility, and professionalism in specific details. The few things that have been achieved in the issue of this conflict settlement have been done due to Russia, or due to her active participation. The problem is not in the mediators but the positions of the parties. Not the mediators should be criticized (which is done quite often), but we should check whether we have done everything in a duly manner. The situation has not reached that level yet, but the parties could learn from their own mistakes.