November 11, 2009
In my pervious speech (18.09.2009) I had promised to discuss the Armenian–Turkish protocols in more detail on some other occasion. I think the current situation, which has been clarified as a result of their signing is the most convenient opportunity for fulfilling that promise. I will try to refrain from making emotional assessments and analyze what has happened, as well as its consequences exclusively from the political perspective. I only have to warn that despite the expectations of the media my speech is going to be not programmatic but explanatory, although I do not deny the need for a programmatic speech as well.
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So, despite the impressive protest rallies in Armenia and in the Diaspora Serge Sargsyan, as was expected, signed the controversial protocols after all, being guided not by state or national interests but by the goal of acquiring external legitimacy and maintaining his hold on power. The unnecessary concession he made allowing the creation of a commission of Armenian and Turkish historians is sufficient for making this claim indisputable because no other consideration could explain it. There is nothing surprising in this: there was a time when in exchange for appropriate services Armenian kings used to receive investiture from Arabs, at other times from Mongols and now apparently Sargsyan is receiving an investiture from the West.
If we are fair-minded however, we have to point out that Serge Sargsyan did not implement the plan of signing the Armenian–Turkish protocols alone. In that endeavor he received unconditional support from the Republican, Country of Laws and Prosperous Armenia parties, the Supreme Spiritual Council of the Armenian church headed by the catholicos Garegin II, the Public Council adjunct to the president of RA headed by Vazgen Manoukyan, the Armenian Assembly of America headed by Hrayr Hovnanyan, the Armenian General Benevolent Union under the honorary presidency of Luise-Simone Manougyan, the presidency of the Academy of Sciences of the RA lead by Radik Martirosyan, Armenia’s criminal-oligarchic economic elite represented by all the well-known individuals with nicknames, the presidents of state universities such as Aram Simonyan, Suren Zolyan and others, and finally the entire court intelligentsia with the silent agreement of Zori Balayan, Sos Sargsyan, Perch Zeytuntsyan, Ruben Gevorgyants and others. It is indicative, however, that none of the representatives of the listed organizations and groups, with possible exceptions of a few republicans, had the courage to personally defend the policy adopted by Serge Sargsyan, making instead the cowardly choice of hiding behind the collective statements and expressions of support, which did not require taking personal responsibility. In essence, everybody abandoned their president and left him to fend for himself. No minister, no academician, no president of a university, no oligarch, and no intellectual stood by him personally.
As for the critics of the Armenian–Turkish protocols, with different motives and manifestations their list included the Armenian masses of the Diaspora, the catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia, the Armenian National Congress, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the Social-Democrat Hnchak Party, the Heritage Party, the party New Times, Unification and Sardarabad civic movements, some parts of the Ramkavar Azatakan party, almost a dozen of small organizations which had joined the public protests of the ARF, as well as several politicians and political commentators such as Vardan Oskanyan, Tigran Torosyan, Andranik Tevanyan, Aram Amatuni, Hakob Badalyan, and others. It is important to take into account the fact, however, that despite the apparent commonality, the oppositional camp revealed a principal difference in approaches, one of which was articulated by the Armenian National Congress, while the other by all the remaining forces listed above. This circumstance has created certain misunderstandings and errors in interpretation, which must be clarified.
Before that, however, it must be mentioned that aside from these clearly divergent two camps, there was also a massive army of indifferent individuals, which did not react to the protocols in any way, as it is not reacting to the dangerous developments in the Karabakh negotiations. As sad and disconcerting as this phenomenon is, it is not surprising, because one can hardly expect a surge of patriotism from a public that is being oppressed, deprived of its rights, despoiled, and condemned to mere subsistence by its authorities. I should add that this phenomenon, which has been studied systematically, is common to all societies, and not just characteristic of ours. It has occurred many times in history, having become one of the reasons for the destruction of many states and even empires. The public’s indifference, of course, suits the authorities’ fine, and it should first and foremost worry the opposition. But in the end that indifference is going to turn against the authorities. When at some decisive moment they need the public’s support, they are not going to receive it. As important as it is, however, this is an entirely separate question, which is outside of the scope of the issue at hand – the assessment of the positions of the oppositional camp.
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First and foremost it is easy to see that in contrast to the Congress, which rose in opposition to the Armenian–Turkish protocols from the perspective of real politics, the other forces shifted the problem to the realm of ideology, i.e. the realm of the Armenian Cause, which has no relationship to real politics and the true interests of our country. The Congress expressed two clear objections, one of which had to do with the creation of the historians’ commission that would cast doubt on the reality of the genocide, while the other had to do with the condition that the protocols had to be ratified, which opens an opportunity for Turkey to condition the normalization of its relations with Armenia on the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. In contrast to the Congress, the political forces that advocate the Armenian Cause added to the aforementioned objections the questions regarding the unacceptability of fixing the Armenian–Turkish border, the recognition of the Armenian genocide and the Armenian people’s historic rights by Turkey, as well as the compensation of the material losses incurred by Western Armenians.
By doing so these forces created the impression that the Congress is displaying passivity and lack of principle in its criticism of the Armenian–Turkish protocols and that it is only them that are seriously fighting against Serge Sargsyan’s “anti-national” policy. While in reality they on the one hand demeaned the argument about the unacceptability of the creation of the historians’ commission, which is the most dangerous point of the protocols, and on the other hand provided great service to Serge Sargsyan by unwittingly boosting his international credit by the irrational demands they put forward. Despite the personal humiliation he was subjected in the rallies in Armenia and especially in the Diaspora, Sargsyan has immeasurably strengthened his international position thanks to that nationalistic hysteria, presenting himself to the world as a realistic and decisive statesman worthy of the 21st century who is prepared to make courageous and non-populist choices in the name of his principles. It is not a coincidence at all, therefore, that immediately after the signing of the protocols he was recognized as “the European of the week,” from where to the Nobel Prize it is only one step, and everybody knows what that step is.
The extreme nationalists, particularly the ARF, are putting themselves in an uncomfortable position from another prospective as well, which is that on the one hand they defend the principle of establishing relations without preconditions and complain against the preconditions put forward by Turkey, and on the other hand they insist on preconditions of their own. In order for this charge not to seem groundless, I think it is appropriate to quote a lengthy passage from a document called “Roadmap for the Activities of ARF’s Organization in Armenia” (23.10.2009), where we literally read the following: “Prerequisites for establishing normal relations between Armenia and Turkey can be created only after Turkey recognizes the Armenian genocide and shows readiness to pay compensation, and after halting the joint Turkish–Azerbaijani anti-Armenian policy. Launching a process of normalizing the bilateral relations without preconditions is an extremely serious and momentous step and it should be the only concession by Armenia at this historical juncture… The foreign policy of Armenia should aim at resisting the anti-Armenian programs of the Turkish–Azerbaijani tandem and be guided by the following principles: to assess as illegitimate and insulting to our national dignity the preconditions put forward by Turkey; to thwart the attempts to link the Turkish–Armenian relations to the process of the Karabakh negotiations, which otherwise would result in the splitting of the complete package of demands comprising of the Armenian Cause; not to sign any agreement that could result in nullifying the international legal force or compromising the significance of the decision of the US president Woodrow Wilson; to make the problems of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the compensation for it integral elements of Armenia’s foreign policy until the rights of the Armenian people, which are not subject to any statute of limitations, are restored; to rule out any action that would harm the process of the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and by doing so to neutralize the efforts of the Turkish side at denying it.”
One can simply despair looking at this pile of words, which has nothing to do with politics and which is full of internal contradictions. If this was not about as serious a problem as the Armenian–Turkish reconciliation, one would think we were dealing not with a program of a political party, but with a political pamphlet. Be it as it may, despite its internal contradictions and impenetrability, the meaning of what is said is absolutely clear: according to the ARF, Armenia should build its relations with Turkey on the basis of such an agreement, which would not rule out the possibility of making demands in the future that Turkey recognize the Genocide and compensate Armenia materially and with territory. Since it is a given that Turkey will never agree to such conditions, the goal of such a position is clear: to do everything to thwart the normalization of Armenian–Turkish relations no matter how many times the ARF repeats that “it is not and never has been against the normalization of Armenia–Turkey relations” (Proposed Changes by ARF, Yerevan 2009, page 2). As the ARF and the other forces that advocate the pursuit of the Armenian Cause imagine, the Armenian–Turkish relations must be normalized not on the basis of mutual concessions and the expression of good will but on the basis of Turkey’s unconditional capitulation, and since it looks like Turkey has no intention of capitulating, they must have the courage to state openly that they are against the normalization of Armenian–Turkish relations no matter what. After all, why do we need that normalization, if according to Vardan Oskanyan’s brilliant judgement, Armenia can develop for the next hundred years without lifting the blockade.
Aside from all of this, the posture of the forces advocating the Armenian Cause lacks seriousness and is also vulnerable from an ethical standpoint. It is completely incomprehensible, for example, that the ARF is protesting against the current Armenian–Turkish boarder when it is that party that has drawn those boarders by signing the Treaty of Alexandrapol. Or how is it demanding that Turkey recognize the historic rights of Armenian people when by signing the aforementioned treaty it has renounced the Treaty of Sevres. It is equally true in Vardan Oskanyan’s case. Why has he suddenly remembered Western Armenia and his native Marash, when during the period of holding high office he did not in any way react to Robert Kocharyan’s statement about not having any territorial demands from Turkey, why he did not say that it was treason or that it trampled on the historic rights of the Armenian people, etc? And if all of this is so, who is going to believe the ARF and Oskanyan that their current posture is sincere and that it is not aimed at scoring cheap political points? Perhaps it is also worth mentioning that according to the majority of the public it is hard to get the impression of sincerity when looking at the fake rallies organized by the ARF and the efforts to shift the responsibility for signing the Armenian–Turkish protocols from Serge Sargsian to Eduard Nalbandian.
Finally the criticism of Serge Sargsian couched in terms of the Armenian Cause is also groundless from the perspective of the historical truth. It is not just to add sins that he has not committed to the many sins that he has. It was not Sargsyan who first recognized the existing Armenian–Turkish boarder – the ARF and the Bolsheviks did that before him with the treaties of Alexandrapol and Kars. He was not the one who renounced territorial claims against Turkey – Robert Kocharyan did that. He was not the one who demanded that Turkey recognized the Armenian Genocide, receiving in response the proposal to create a commission of historians – Kocharyan and Vardan Oskanyan did that. He was not the one who excluded Karabakh from the negotiating process – it was Kocharyan’s, Oskanyan’s and Arkadi Ghukasyan’s wrongdoing. And finally it is not Sargsyan, who can call the Madrid principles his “achievement”- he has inherited them from Kocharyan and Oskanyan. Sargsyan is responsible for all of this only to the extent that he was a member of Kocharyan’s regime, and he is no more responsible than the forces who were supporters or parts of that regime, some of which are pretending to be in the opposition now in order to evade their share of responsibility.
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The impression that the Armenian National Congress is passive or does not have a principled position in criticizing the Armenian–Turkish protocols is accounted for by the fact that its position is viewed in a misleading comparison with a seemingly more hard-line and radical stance by forces advocating for the Armenian Cause. The comparison is misleading, first and foremost, because the simple truth that it is the effective and the rational, and not the radical and the hard-line, that is of value in politics is being ignored. Whatever they think about the Congress, being a strictly rational political movement, it could not have joined the choir of the nationalistic hysteria after the signing of the protocols, which only strengthened the position of Serge Sargsyan in the international arena. For many members of the Congress and myself personally joining this choir was also impossible ideologically, especially because of our essential reservations about the ideology of the Armenian Cause. The Armenian Cause, or the ideology based on territorial demands, is a doctrine fit only for a stateless nation. A nation that has a state should be guided by entirely different categories. It is high time we understood that there is no notion of „historic rights“ in politics or international law, and one cannot speak with the rest of the world using such language without leaving appearing mentally incompetent. No matter how hard we try, nobody understands or will ever understand this language. The term „historic right“ belongs to the field of propaganda, and propaganda, important as it is, cannot and should not be a substitute for policy.
It was mentioned above, that the Congress has considered and continues to view the normalization of the Armenian–Turkish relations not as a matter of ideology, but as a political issue. Therefore, we had to evaluate the signed protocols from a purely political angle, which we actually did. Based on that approach, from the viewpoint of real politics there is only one provision in the protocols unacceptable for the Congress, the one that speaks about the establishment of the joint commission of Armenian and Turkish historians. Why would we deem this question to be so important? The answer is that
– notwithstanding the official propaganda claims and assurances, its main, if not only, topic of discussion will be the Genocide issue, or else Turkey would not have considered the establishment of this commission to be its groundbreaking achievement;
– it will inevitably lead to the calling into question the very fact of the Armenian Genocide and to putting an end to the process of its international recognition. We are far from believing, of course, that the parliaments of the countries, which recognized the Armenian Genocide in the past, would declare their resolutions void, but at the same time, there is no doubt, that no other country will adopt a resolution like that in the future.
-this will also be a moral and psychological blow for the Diaspora, whose identity, irrespective of our subjective desire, because of the tragic circumstances, rests upon the Genocide, although I would have personally preferred it to be based upon the idea of the strengthening of the Armenian statehood and on universal values.
No matter from which angle we look at this issue, it becomes obvious, that Serge Sargsyan has made an unforgivable mistake by granting his agreement to establish the commission of historians, a mistake, that probably can never be corrected. It is noteworthy that this mistake is unforgivable not only in political, but also in practical sense. If the commission of historians is established with the aim to assist the process of Armenian–Turkish reconciliation, it could hardly serve this goal, because most probably it will provide a stage for an endless debate, which will only deepen the differences between the two nations. If, however, the Armenian diplomacy has an expectation to trade its consent to establish this commission for an open border with Turkey, such a concession is absolutely unnecessary, because the opening of the border has nothing to do with this issue, but is linked to the Karabakh conflict resolution. It follows that whether the commission of historians was established or not, after the Karabakh issue has been settled, Armenian–Turkish relations would also be normalized and the border would be opened anyway. Thus, even if we consider the establishment of the commission of historians to be a matter of commercial trade-off, it will appear to be a failed undertaking, or, at least, not the one that envisages the establishment of the commission in exchange for the open border, but, at best, a trade-off that presupposes the establishment of the commission in exchange for the recognition of Serge Sargsyan’s legitimacy.
As distinct from other political forces, which started to voice their concerns about the establishment of the commission of historians mainly after the protocols had been made public (August 31, 2009), the Armenian National Congress repeatedly alerted the public at large about it long before that. During the last two years I, myself only, addressed this issue in detail in seven of my public talks, first speaking about it as far back as on December 8, 2007 (also see Sept.15, Oct. 17, Dec.21, 2008; May 1, May 15 and June 12, 2009). I am not registering these facts with the aim to reproach others, but I am doing that with pain and, let me stress again, with political considerations. I think that had the rest of the political forces responded to the alarm raised by the Congress and had they focused solely on this issue, without vulgarizing it with the ideology based on territorial claims, it would have probably been possible to prevent the inclusion of the provision on the establishment of the commission of historians into the protocols.
Besides the principal objection to the establishment of the commission of historians, the Congress, as it was already mentioned above, expressed its concern regarding the procedural condition, which envisages ratification of the Armenian–Turkish protocols by the parliaments of both countries. Such a condition by itself would not have been a problem, had it not enabled Turkey to link the ratification question with the demand to first settle the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The fact that this concern is not groundless is confirmed by the modality and the atmosphere of the debates on the ratification of the protocols that have been recently started in the Turkish parliament, as well as by the countless statements made with regard to this issue by high-ranking officials of that country. With all this proof to the contrary, it is ludicrous to continue claiming that the settlement of the Armenian–Turkish relations is not linked to the Karabakh conflict resolution. Moreover, these stubborn claims, which are incessantly voiced both by Armenian and Western diplomats, testify to the opposite, i.e. to the fact that the Armenian–Turkish problem and the Karabakh conflict will be resolved in one package. I predicted that as far back as in my 17 October, 2008 public speech, having added that “an attempt will be made to include into the package the establishment of the Armenian–Turkish commission of historians with the aim to study the Genocide” which became a reality.
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To further clarify the position of the Congress on the issues discussed above, I deem it necessary to once again stress the following basic points:
– We support both the quick normalization of the Armenian–Turkish relations and the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which should be based upon the principles of mutual compromise and balance.
– At the same time, we are categorically against the establishment of the joint commission of Armenian and Turkish historians, which aside from calling into question the fact of the Armenian Genocide, will not only fail to help the process of the Armenian–Turkish rapprochement but will definitely hamper it.
– As for the Karabakh issue, any settlement plan, which does not outline a mechanism of the deployment of the peace-keeping forces, which fails to define the status of the Lachin corridor and falls short of elaborating the conditions of the referendum, will remain problematic for us.
– The dangerous developments in the Armenian–Turkish relations and the Karabakh conflict settlement can only be aborted by the change of power in Armenia, which can’t be done as long as this truth has not been realized by all political forces, and as long as a significant part of our society remains indifferent to the national issues.
– The division line between the political forces is the question of Serge Sargsyan’s resignation. Those who demand it are the real opposition, while those who do not are backing the authorities, no matter how hard they pretend to be concerned about the undesirable developments mentioned above.
– As for the questions of the change of power and the restoration of the constitutional order in the country, we are ready to cooperate with any political force, even ones subscribing to different ideologies, with the exception of external forces.
As far as I know, no other political force does have such a clear-cut, realistic position, which would be based upon the real interests of Armenia and Karabakh. From my perspective, “not an inch of land”, “no concession” or “no reconciliation” slogans, no matter how clear they seem, do not qualify to be political positions as they could lead our people to national disaster. And when these slogans are not accompanied by demands for resignation and change of power, they also become false and pharisaic.
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Now let us see what is in store for us. Although it is difficult to make predictions, approximately the following scenario seems likely to me:
– The Turkish parliament will delay the process of ratification of the protocols, or will ratify them with certain reservations. By doing so, it will try to speed up the settlement of the Karabakh conflict.
– The Armenian parliament will be guided by the wait-and-see tactics, and will try to start the ratification discussions only after the protocols have been ratified by Turkey.
-To come out of this deadlock, with the Karabakh problem perceived as a stumbling block on the way to do it, the international community will spare no effort to speed up the Karabakh resolution process, which is in full accord with the Turkish position.
– Serge Sargsyan pointing out to the harsh protest actions and opposition to the signing of the Armenian–Turkish protocols in Armenia and the Diaspora, will ask the mediators to give him a time-out in the Karabakh conflict resolution process. His argumentation will be that in a short period of time it will be difficult for him to withstand and endure another wave of protest like that.
– Understanding Serge Sargsyan’s argument, the international community will nevertheless deny his request, and taking immediate advantage of his weakness, will, on the contrary, increase the pressure on Armenia with regard to the Karabakh problem.
– It is quite probable, that the interested parties will urge Armenia to be the first to ratify the protocols, claiming that after that Turkey will find it difficult to further delay the ratification process.
– The logic of the situation implies that in the coming months it will not be the Armenian–Turkish relations but rather the Karabakh settlement, where main developments are to be expected, because the main precondition for the Armenian–Turkish reconciliation is not the Genocide problem, but the Karabakh conflict resolution.
As you see, the situation is extremely delicate and sensitive, and requires great responsibility both from the authorities and the opposition who equally face most difficult issues and challenges. On the one hand, the problem is that the internal standoffs do not harm the processes of normalization of the Armenian–Turkish relations and the Karabakh conflict resolution; on the other hand it is necessary to make sure that these processes are secured against dangerous and undesirable developments for the Armenian people. The Armenian National Congress has always been and will always be guided by this responsible mind-set, avoiding reckless actions and political maximalism, and taking into account, first and foremost, the state interest. Unfortunately, one cannot say the same about the authorities, which stubbornly refuse to use the most valuable resource to withstand the external challenges, which is the strengthening and consolidating Armenia’s position by solving domestic issues and establishing national solidarity.
The following puzzle does not make any sense to me. Since there is no doubt that to gain legitimacy from the outside world Serge Sargsyan makes unnecessary concessions with regard to the issues of normalization of the Armenian–Turkish relations and the Karabakh conflict resolution, what is it that prevents him from requesting legitimacy from his own people, instead of being so much humiliated and obliged to make such concessions? In the XVII century there lived one priest in Turkey, named Eghiazar of Ayntap, whose power-hunger and vanity knew no limits, and who, by giving bribes and by intrigues managed to be declared the Catholicos of Turkish Armenians, thus gravely jeopardizing the unity of the Armenian Church and people. The Echmiadzin brotherhood of that time summoned a meeting and addressed him with the following offer: “Brother, if you wish to become a Catholicos, come and be the Catholicos of All Armenians, only don’t divide the church and bring such a disaster upon our nation”. Eghiazar accepted the offer and comfortably ruled in Holy Echmiadzin for ten years (1681–1691). So the imminent and disastrous threat to the Armenian Church was averted. In the entire history of the Armenian people, I don’t know of another example of a true national thinking that would match the wisdom and open-mindedness of the decision made by that brotherhood of Echmiadzin. Why would Serge Sargsyan think, that the Armenians are unable to show once again such wisdom and open-mindedness for the sake of the national goals?