– Mr. Hovhannisyan, do you think that the recent meeting of the Armenian and Azeri presidents in Prague has brought to any positive results toward the settlement of Karabakh conflict? Following the meeting the American co-chair Matthew Bryza announced that the parties had agreed upon all the issues they had to discuss at the mentioned meeting, but later the foreign affairs minister of France announced that the negotiations had been difficult and the parties did not agree upon a number of issues.
– When the problems were almost solved in Balkan States, when the issues of Abkhazia and South Osetia were temporarily closed following the war in August, the issue of Karabakh conflict became more important because the big countries started paying more attention to it. The stocks, if we can call their efforts like this, were invested in this region. Thus, the disagreements between these countries became more visible in the process of Karabakh conflict, and it is clear that there is no consensus as it has been till now too. Bryza’s optimistic announcements are not news. However to me the announcements of the foreign affairs minister of France, who said that the parties should not be discouraged, are more important. In fact, they admit that this meeting has not approximated the positions of the conflicting parties this time either.
– Was the announcement following the meeting of Aliyev and Sargsyan reading that the issue of fulfillment of the resolutions 1609, 1620 and 1643 on the part of Armenia will be included in the agenda of June session made by coincidence?
– I don’t know, I don’t want to assume how things are. However one thing is pretty clear. If the European Parliament adopts sanctions, it will have to impose sanctions on Russia, Azerbaijan and other countries as well. We are doing the right thing when we criticize the European countries for adopting double standards. However I don’t think that they may impose punishments on our country this time. Also it is evident that the Eastern partnership does not contemplate specific policies in specific relationships with separate countries such as Georgia, Russia, Armenia, etc.
– Don’t you think that the issue of Karabakh conflict is a precondition for developing Armenian-Turkish relations? Do you see such danger?
– It is natural that throughout the negotiations with Armenia the Turkish government will have several purposes. The first goal is aimed at the American-Turkish relations, which have been worsening during the past ten years, and now they have an opportunity to improve these relations due to several policy directions, one of which is connected with Armenia. The second direction is connected with improving the Russian-Turkish relations, which may enable Turkey have a bigger role in the region. The third goal is that Turkey wants to recover the balance which used to exist in the Black Sea region, and which was shocked after the Russian-Georgian war when the US navy entered the region. The Black Sea is slowly becoming the target lake of the NATO. The next goal is connected with energy resources and transit opportunities, as a result of which they want to keep the relations with Azerbaijan at a high level and not to spoil the relations, which are undermined now. And in the last place of this list the last goal is the developing relations with Armenia. As for our interests, our main goal is not to allow the issue of Karabakh conflict be linked with the Armenian-Turkish relations. Several months ago I was sure that our government was successfully following the principles, which are in the base of the peaceful process led by the intermediary group of Minsk. In other words, I thought that our government was preventing the issue of Karabakh conflict from being linked with the issue of the relations with Turkey. However, today I am more pessimistic because our government does not estimate the role of Armenia in the region in a duly manner. There is a danger that Turkey may negotiate with Russia for the purpose of linking the issue of Karabakh with the prospective of opening the border. In such case any potential pressure on Armenia or Azerbaijan may prevent the process of development of the Armenian-Turkish relations. It is also important for our country to diversify the foreign policy for the purpose of getting new opportunities for diplomatic maneuvering. On the other hand, we should not jeopardize any mythologem of keeping the Armenian national values, consciousness, mentality and identity. One of such important mythologems, on which the Armenian identity is based and living outside of Armenia, is the genocide. The creation of a commission of historians, whether it is under the umbrella of the names of governmental or any other commissions, will jeopardize that established fact of reality. I live in Armenia, it does not jeopardize my identity, but it will jeopardize the identity of the Armenian Diaspora out of Armenia.
– For example, let’s assume that the Turkish party suggests us to establish such commission, recognize the agreement of Kars, and also it takes the responsibility to open the borders without linking the issue of Karabakh conflict with it, and on the other hand as a second version, if Armenia refuses the establishment of such commission and the borders are not opened. Which one of these two versions is preferable?
– As for recognition of the borders, there is a standard formulation in the protocol of establishing diplomatic relations, according to which the two parties establish diplomatic relations through recognizing the territorial integrity and sovereignty. As for the possibility of establishing a commission of historians, Turkey is interested in such commission for the purpose of preventing the recognition of the genocide on part of the United States. Thus, it is the business of the US and Turkey, so Armenia has some opportunities to maneuver. However there is a big possibility that the Armenian-Turkish border may be opened within one year.