Last week Peter Semneby visited Yerevan and had meeting with the Armenian authorities and the opposition. Before leaving Yerevan he talked to the Mediamax correspondent.
– You visited Armenia this time after quite a long break, especially if we compare with the rate of your visits during the post-election period in 2008. What are your most vivid impressions from this visit – both negative and positive?
– The most vivid impression is the role is that the economic crisis is now playing in the policy making and in the thinking of all the at least the political part of Armenian society. The risks that the economic crisis involves in terms of also social issues, and perhaps also the risk that it involves in terms of the social issues then carry over into the political field.
This is all happening, unfortunately, against the background of the political polarization that still continues a year after the events of the 1st of March, 2008. This is perhaps in many ways the most problematic aspect that Armenian society has not really come to terms with itself after these difficult events.
As far as the relations with the European Union are concerned, we have perhaps a rather paradoxical development in the sense that the war in Georgia with all its drama and tragedy and the problems of a more practical kind that occurred as a result of that war, all of this has actually strengthened the links between the countries in the South Caucasus and the European Union. It became clear to many in the EU after this war that the security problems and security issues in the Caucasus have a direct impact for the EU and that the EU really doesn’t have any choice but to engage more clearly with the countries in the regions: both bilaterally and also in terms of facilitating regional cooperation.
This is the background for the proposal that is still only a proposal, but one that will certainly move forward and form another to create and launch an Eastern Partnership consisting of the countries in the South Caucasus and Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. And I am very happy to see that Armenia has enthusiastically embraced this idea.
There have been some other positive side effects, I would say, of this dramatic year and that the war in Georgia as well, and there has been the thaw that we are observing in Turkish-Armenian relations: again we have two countries, for which the war demonstrated the risks and the negative aspects of not taking advantage of the potential that geography offers. The fact that borders remain closed in the region and potentially important communication corridors are not being utilized, is a security risk for the entire region.
– There is no dialogue between the Armenian authorities and the opposition, since each of the sides puts forward its preconditions. Authorities state that the opposition should recognize the outcome of the elections that took place a year ago. The opposition says that the authorities should release all political prisoners. What would you advise both sides to take the situation out of this deadlock?
– I do sense after this visit a greater sense of urgency on both sides to overcome these difficulties and overcome the confrontation and the lack of communication that has been so painful for Armenian society of the course of the last year. There are a number of reasons for this. Time is one reason obviously. It appears to most of those, who are stakeholders here, that the situation is abnormal a year after the election, a year after the 1st of March. Another reason is related to all the challenges that Armenia has been facing during the last year. And both the government and the opposition have a sense of responsibility vis-à-vis the country, vis-à-vis the nation that is related all to the consequences of the war in Georgia in August, and also to the financial-economic crisis, which is now also starting to affect Armenia seriously. We’ll need involvement of as large part of the society as possible.
– You met in prison Alexandr Arzumanian, one of the oppositional leaders. Does this fact mean that you recognize him and his colleagues as a “political prisoner” as opposition calls them?
– Well, I don’t want to put any label on, but it is obviously an issue of concern that deserves our attention, when political leaders find themselves in detention for alleged crimes that are linked to their political activities. It is clear that it’s an extraordinary situation that Armenia finds itself in, with this issue still being on the agenda, still causing pain and consternation and contributing to perpetuating the division in society a year after these events took place.
– When meeting you Armenian PM said that Armenia will count on EU support in overcoming the influence of the global financial and economic crisis. Do you think that some special assistance programs could be set up, or the focuses of the existing programs will be shifted to social-economic issues?
– Well, I think there are elements of both here. The financial institutions that are linked to the European Union, the European Investment Bank, for example, could possibly provide financing for important projects, but of course, it’s also a matter of refocusing existing assistance.
– We have the Armenian-Turkish dialogue taking place for the past 6-7 months. Do you believe that it could provide some concrete results like the setting up of diplomatic relations and opening the border during this year?
– Both sides are cautious in expressing expectations and I think that it is wise in sensitive negotiation of this kind. I am encouraged though by what I have seen and what I have heard. I was present myself on the 6th of September, 2008 at the historical event that took place at the football match between Armenia and Turkey. And I was encouraged by the atmosphere of great expectation that I sensed on this occasion. I think this must have been inspiration also to the leaders of both countries to move forward, but I would not dare to speculate about any timelines here.
– During the Munich Security Conference Turkish FM Ali Babacan said that improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations will change the geopolitical situation in the region. Do you agree with him?
– There are obviously several conflicts in the Caucasus that have had an enormously negative influence on the both security and prosperity of this region, which means also that the resolution of any one of these open issues, be it Turkey-Armenia, be it Armenia-Azerbaijan, or be it Georgia-Russia, would have a profound positive impact. This is a matter of taking advantage of the obvious joint interests that exist across the borders in spite of countries having different opinions and perspectives on some issues. And once those joint interests, in case of Turkey and Armenia there are obvious economic interests, interests in developing transportation, in terms of developing commerce across the border and so on.
Ultimately security is best sustained through developing joint activities and joint economic interaction between parties that have previously not engaged fully with each other. In the case of Armenia and Turkey, to some extent, economic interaction has been there in the past, but what has been missing obviously is that, although they are close neighbors, they have been rather distant neighbors in many ways, since there has not been the direct interaction across the border.
– What contributed to the beginning of the dialogue? Was it an issue of political courage and will of Turkish and Armenian leaders, the war in Georgia or some other factors? Here a question arises: if this is so easy, why wasn’t the dialogue initiated long time ago?
– Well, I think it was a combination of both fear and opportunity: fear because of the direct impact that the Georgia war had, because of the potential impact that further problems, clashes, military action in the region could have, but also opportunity in the sense that the war in Georgia created a more fluid situation, the rather ossified patterns of interaction that had existed in the region for so long were suddenly easier to challenge and both countries took advantage of this to enhance the space for themselves in the region.
– Last year an agreement was reached on EU Advisory Mission, which was to start working in Yerevan. At which stage is it now, when will it begin its work and what will be the main directions of its work?
– This is a resource actually. These advisors are not there in order to be prescriptive. They are in order to be at the disposal of the Armenian authorities, in order to share their experiences, European practices, and give inputs whenever the authorities will find as useful in the preparation of policies, initiatives and so on.
These will be senior level people with extensive experience from their respective fields that will be extremely useful if the Armenian authorities decide to use them in the way that we envisaged. We believe, this will contribute to bringing Armenian policies closer to European practices, to bring the way of thinking in various government institutions closer to European practices and, thereby, to build a stronger link, a stronger bond between Armenia and EU. This will take place very soon, within the next couple of months.
– There is a lot of talks about the EU “Eastern Partnership”. Don’t you think that expectations of the authorities of the countries involved and Armenia in particular are exaggerated and this may become a source of frustration in future?
– I would say it is an important step. Of course it is an upgrading and a refinement of the European Neighborhood Policy. But I don’t see why this should be seen as something negative. The EU and its partners have still not taken full advantage of European Neighborhood Policy and in that prospective it is a very positive step that they have this new initiative that includes new elements already at this relatively early stage after the European Neighborhood Policy was extended to Armenia and its neighboring countries.
As envisaged, it involves both a much stronger bilateral link with the EU and a regional interaction prospective that hardly existed at all before. The bilateral link will involve stronger political commitment in the form of an association agreement. It will involve a strong commitment to free trade, to enhanced freedom of movement and enhanced sectoral cooperation in many areas. The regional component will involve cooperation platforms within several different areas that will make sure to address joint interests between neighboring countries that are necessary to deal with in order to make sure that there are also important aspects of the relations with the region as a whole and with European Union. This does not mean that the regional cooperation aspects are the overriding ones. Still fundamentally, there will be a large degree of differentiation that will depend on the willingness and the ability of each individual country to complete these tasks.
From the prospective of the European Union itself, what this involves is also a much clearer focus on the Eastern neighborhood, a much greater visibility for the Eastern neighborhood. And this should not be underestimated. In the larger European Neighborhood Policy, which also contains the Mediterranean Basin, the specifics of the Eastern neighbors, their commonalities in terms of their background, their transition agendas, their aspirations in terms of how they want to build their relations with the European Union have not been that clearly defined and clearly acknowledged. And this will be a great contribution of the Eastern Partnership.