Continued from previous edition
The second stage of state construction in Armenia was supposed to begin after the ceasefire signed in May 1994. The first stage began in 1990 with the Supreme Council elections, approval of the Declaration of Independence which preceded the independence referendum and the first presidential elections of Armenia. These were electoral processes taking place with the full popular vote and there was no shady business. Nobody suspected that the 1990 parliamentary elections, the referendum in ’91 or the presidential elections were free and fair, but the Karabakh conflict turning into a war, the collapse of the economy, the decline in the prosperity of the population and especially the energy/fuel crisis was turning the fairly elected government vulnerable.
The vulnerability of the government was conditioned by the system classification which was more outlined after the declaration of ceasefire when Armenia victoriously ended the military operations. Before the ceasefire declaration, striving to come to power was more like the warning shots which, indeed, had a positive impact. Government was doing everything it could to reach success on the military front and preventing the collapse of the economy. However, it would be wrong to say that the Armenian opposition truly wanted to take control of the country during the time of war.
The opposition understood that the Armenian National Movement was doing the dirtiest work during that period. It also understood that by coming to power, it [they] would be forced to do things for which they criticized the Armenian National Movement and president Ter-Petrosyan personally. For example, by criticizing the army enlistments in ’93 and ’94, the opposition realized that it should have been doing that too if it wanted to succeed on the military front. The people configuring “clear” economic mechanisms on paper and the ones “filling” the consumer basket of the population knew that a lot of effort is needed to live the good life; effort that can often result in vain. After all, it was a time of trial-and-error and every good thought and idea definitely could not have had a positive impact.
After the ceasefire, it was going to be a time to summarize the results of the trials. Now the job was easier-there was no war, no worry for another war outbreak and it was possible to focus completely on economic issues, solve or at least try to leave the impression of solving those issues.
The Armenian National Movement understood that ceding power after doing the dirty work would be foolish and thought that you just can’t pass your achievements and errors on to somebody else. The ceasefire gave an opportunity to relax and that was the opportunity to regulate the economy, fortify the state and why not, fortify the government as well.
In 1994, the people of Armenia could have agreed to “reconciliation” with the government they had elected three-four years before that. Both the government and the opposition knew that and that is why the latter started a PR campaign which presented the government that won the war as a group of criminals. The blame of living in the dark and cold years was thrown on the criminal authorities (black oil case which later turned out had nothing to do with the Armenian National Movement), the loss of economic power, centralization of society and many other similar issues.
The renowned microphone of Arshak Sadoyan which can today be put on the grave of the opposition was ejecting the possible and impossible sins and instilling the impossibility of coming to power tolerated by the opposition in the minds of Armenian society.
Black PR excluded the struggle of proposing ideas which did not even exist as such. The National Democratic Union was like the Armenian National Movement painted with colors of pretentious nationalism. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation did not have any ideological issue at the time and could not even have any problems because the government that had forced the ceasefire to Azerbaijan was more federative than the Federation itself. All that was left was the Communist Party whose ideas were already internationally incomprehensive. The Russia governed by Yeltsin and the West would hardly accept a power whose only main argument was the doubtful advantage of what had happened and what still had not taken place.
In these conditions, society should not have elected ideas, but rather saints and the sinners. There were five sinners, including Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Vano Siradeghyan, Vazgen Sargsyan, Hrant Bagratyan and Babken Ararktsyan. There were also five saints: Vazgen Manukyan, David Vartanyan, Arshak Sadoyan, Shavarsh Kocharyan and Seyran Avagyan. This last quintet which seemed inseparable was getting ready to save Armenia with the old “Liberty, Brotherhood, Equality” slogan, but in order to not get ahead of myself, I must say that they did not know for whom and for what that slogan was. A mass of society (let’s conditionally call them the population in peace) was ready to follow them, but was not ready to lead. The second Armenian revolution was going to fail.