As expected the “window of opportunities 2006” of Karabagh conflict resolution was closed and no agreement was made between the sides. Most probably 2007 won’t bring any fertile results either, In parallel with Karabagh conflict the issues of Javaghk is also gradually maturing for the society.
Of course, if wanted here we can only see the “Russian track” and pretend there is no other reason. It’s understandable that Russia tried its best to “punish” Georgia and during this process the Russian might “need” Javaghk. Is it only the Russian “track” though? Is it a coincidence that the Javaghk issue is originating after realizing that Karabagh conflict resolution is closed for 2006? In order to find an answer to this question let’s try to understand the perceptions of Armenian politicians about Karabagh conflict resolution.
For example, chairman of “Dashink” (alliance) party, Samvel Babayan during his last interview to “Mitk” analytical center, mentioned that Karabagh must receive auxiliary independence (let’s say in the custody of EU), prerequisites must be created to develop the economy of Karabagh, later the repatriation of refugees must be undertaken (exceptionally on voluntary basis). In the end he suggests determining Karabagh status through referendum. As you noticed there’s no word about the liberated territories (but it’s assumes that those territories must be retrieved otherwise refugee repatriation will be impossible to organize).
The thing is that the main concept of those schemes is to integrate South Caucasus to the EU, live in democratic conditions and provide human rights. This will enable the final resolution of the conflicts in the region. The problem is that Azerbaijan doesn’t want this and tries to isolate Armenia from all regional projects. Moreover, Babayan knows himself that prolongation of the resolution is not on our behalf. So what to do now?
In fact the situation is the following. Azerbaijan has currently adopted a fairly rough policy and refused to make serious compromises. Moreover, Azerbaijan has grounds to act like that because it does a good job in isolating Armenia. After the construction of Kars-Akhalkalak-Tbilisi railroad this isolation will become almost perfect. Under these circumstances Armenia has two choices – either make serious compromises and immediately solve the conflict or undertake actions which will fail the efforts of Azerbaijan to isolate Armenia.
More simply said Armenia has appeared in a dilemma. As the maintenance of the status-quo doesn’t work on our behalf any more, the only option is to choose between the two alternatives. We either agree with the stage-by-stage version and immediately remove the troops from at least five areas or we start a movement in Javaghk to hinder the construction of the railway. This way or another the dancer should either twist or leave the dance floor. There is no way to stand motionless.
If we continue the imitation of negotiations and meanwhile don’t undertake anything in Javakhk the it’s not hard to forecast that Armenia will appear in complete isolation. If we continue the imitation of negotiations and we don’t prevent the instigation in Javaghk the military actions will be resumed in Karabagh and we turn out to have two fronts being in conditions of a blockade. Thus logically only one way is possible. That is to prevent the possible “developments” in Javaghk and try to really resolve the Karabagh conflict. But the political idea of Armenians regards this solution as a “national betrayal” and drastically moves the issue to the moral aspect.
The removal of political issues to the moral field as a rule bring only moral victories.