– In your opinion, what did the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen mean when they revealed the secret principles of the Karabagh conflict? Was this pressure on both sides, a final draft, or did they simply want to know the public opinion on the conflict negotiation principles?
– You can call it whatever you want-pressure, a final draft. It means the following: the negotiations can’t go on forever and it just can’t end in itself. They must lead to something. The co-chairmen are trying to give a warning in some way. They have realized that the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan are just pretending to negotiate and that neither side is serious about settling the conflict once and for all. Since the co-chairmen tried to express the interests of each side through the means of the documents, they are simply asking the presidents if they have the political will to settle the conflict.
– After this, do you think that they have that political will?
– I think that they haven’t had that will from the start. Both took advantage of the negotiations as a means of keeping power. They played the same game. They tried to make the international community look at them as peacemakers by showing that they are constructive and ready to make compromises. On the other hand, they tried appearing to their societies as decisive, nationalist and uncompromising. They kept being two-faced until the negotiation principles were no longer confidential. The co-chairmen finally realized that this was all a game and are forbidding the two to continue playing the game by revealing the secrets. Now the presidents must decide what they’re really going to do. In response to your question, I don’t think that they will have that will. But the game will get harder.
– So, what we have is Dayton’s principle of obligated peace.
– Currently, the co-chairmen pressure by threatening that they will no longer mediate and there will be a higher risk of restarting the war. I don’t think they’re ready for the Dayton principle. The Dayton principle is not about pressure; it simply has to do with bombings. Based on the Dayton principle, supposedly we have war or a threat, just like in Bosnia when the NATO forces bombed the Serbians. The co-chairmen don’t really have many methods for pressure, especially for Azerbaijan, which doesn’t have that many chances. Azerbaijan is getting huge profits from oil sales and isn’t really relying on the financial contributions from abroad. It’s very hard to have an influence on Azerbaijan now because it’s euphoric, thinking that it can strengthen the army and lead better negotiations with the profit gained from oil sales. It seems as though Azerbaijan isn’t interested in a peaceful conflict settlement.
– You mentioned that the presidents of the two countries aren’t ready and don’t want to settle the conflict. Are the people ready for that and does Armenia approve the principles revealed by the co-chairmen?
– I think that this agreement is the same as the phased version of 1997. We will only know if it’s better or worse after going further in detail. But it’s really the repetition of the phased process and in my opinion, this is the only way to settle the conflict. Why shouldn’t the people approve it if we are talking about signing an agreement, which keeps Armenia joined with Karabagh and solve the international recognition issue later?
– It seems as though there is no debate between the people, neither in 1997 nor currently. The country’s political figures aren’t making things clear for the public. Why aren’t they doing that?
– The problem is that the peace agreement was neither talked about then, nor now. This is a serious obstacle, which must be overcome. Besides that, as long as the two sides are not decisive to settle the conflict, the people don’t realize that the agreement is something which can be made a reality. Finally, this concerns the people’s view of politics and their mentality. Unfortunately, we don’t think very politically and simply base our opinions on desires. We’re not realistic.
– What parallels can you draw between the Karabagh conflict settlement principles of 1997 and today? Can we expect to see the conflict settled if we approve today’s principles?
– They’re the same thing. But at first sight, there are three different elements. The first is the referendum, the next one is remembering Kelbajar and the third is not remembering the Shahumyan issue. The key element here is the referendum. But let’s try to understand why we need that referendum. It’s clear that this is impossible. Where and how will the referendum be? Who will vote? What will be the issue and what will the consequences be? These are the questions, which the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents will discuss during the future negotiations. Both sides realize that the result of the referendum will depend on the answers to those questions. It’s evident that neither side can agree on that. In reality, this referendum is a means of saving Kocharyan. Kocharyan started talking about the package deal version back in 1998 and said that there is no alternative for the conflict settlement. When the Prague process began in 2004, he rejected the package deal due to pressure from the international community. Now he has to save himself and say that although Karabagh’s status isn’t determined, the system of determining the status is stated in the agreement. He can pinpoint the referendum by saying that it respects Karabagh’s right to be autonomous. But Azerbaijan will look at the idea of having a referendum differently. Azerbaijan says that the referendum must be in Azerbaijan and there is no agreement on how it should be. They simply did that in order to save Kocharyan and give both sides the opportunity to negotiate and reach success.
– What similarities are there between Armenia’s internal political life in 1997-1998 and now, especially since Defense Minister Serge Sargsyan, who is considered as Kocharyan’s most possible successor, will soon become co-chairman of the Armenian Republican Party? Supposedly, he will be the next to come to power.
– I wouldn’t call them similarities. The processes are the same on the surface, but the essence is not. What we have going on is something agreed by both Kocharyan and Sargsyan. I think that Kocharyan’s goal has always been to be nominated for the third term. That’s why they amended the Constitution. But Kocharyan has also looked ahead and made it so that Serge Sargsyan get nominated in case he doesn’t get to serve his third term. Now it seems as though Kocharyan is convinced that there are risks and pressure on him getting elected for the third term. So, what we have is the second variant. I don’t know which technique will work. I consider the current events in Armenia as the fight between oligarchs to come to power. If Kocharyan thinks that Serge Sargsyan will come to power in 2008, then the processes may lead up to the informal nomination of Serge Sargsyan. When the president’s second term ends, his friends and political allies stop coming to terms with him and find themselves next to the most possible successor.
– So, you don’t think that Kocharyan will resign due to the pressure of the Karabagh conflict?
– I don’t see any serious issue or pressure which will make Kocharyan resign. Kocharyan can easily serve his second term until it ends, especially since Azerbaijan still refuses to sign this recent agreement. Why should the president resign? Kocharyan has all the chances to avoid settling the Karabagh conflict during his second term, however unfortunately, that will be on the account of Armenia and Karabagh.