Much of the public comment on Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s recent visit to the United States focused on energy security and Azerbaijan’s southern neighbor, Iran, a focus that reflects Washington’s priorities. But there was a much more significant aspect to the visit, one that stems more from Azerbaijani interests than U.S. priorities. Specifically, Aliyev’s first official visit to the United States since his election in October 2003 served an Azerbaijani agenda much more than a U.S. one. And although both energy and Iran are integral parts of this Azerbaijani agenda, they are only elements of a grander aspiration to emerge as a regional power. In this context, Azerbaijan now holds the initiative over the United States, with a latent leverage that has, so far, gone unnoticed and unchallenged. And it is Iran that provides the first indication of Azerbaijan’s initiative. Despite the historic tension between Azerbaijan and Iran, largely kept alive by Baku’s concerns for its ethnic Azeri kin in northern Iran, Azerbaijan does not see Iran as much of a real threat. In fact, like Russia, Azerbaijan is gaining more from the “status quo” in Iran, as its strategic location bordering Iran enhances its importance. For the Aliyev leadership, this position has brought significant benefits in the shape of increased U.S. military involvement, while at the same time Washington largely turned a blind eye to the deeply flawed November 2005 parliamentary elections. And with the Pentagon’s recognition of the need to secure Iran’s northern border in the event of either multilateral sanctions or unilateral intervention, Azerbaijan’s military and geostrategic importance has expanded well beyond its earlier limited role as an air corridor to Central Asia and Afghanistan. This is important to Baku not only in maintaining U.S. military engagement in the country, but as part of its bid to secure U.S. support for — or at least acquiescence in — its quest to regain control of Azerbaijani territory along the Iranian border that is currently occupied by Armenian forces. It is this geostrategic advantage that has allowed Azerbaijan to sidestep U.S. concerns over its dismal electoral record. And even more importantly, it has also fostered a powerful preference for proximity over politics, with U.S. military considerations sidelining other concerns. In this respect, Aliyev’s White House visit was not designed as a reward, but as a recognition of Azerbaijan’s strategic significance. Yet at the same time, Baku has been actively developing its ties with Tehran. A 2004 visit to Baku by then Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamhani raised defense cooperation to a new level, and a reciprocal visit to Tehran last year by Azerbaijani Defense Minister Colonel General Safar Abiyev resulted in the signing of an intergovernmental agreement on defense cooperation. Moreover, Aliyev’s Washington visit was sandwiched between visits to Baku by both the Iranian defense minister and the Iranian president. On April 20, Aliyev met with Shamhani’s successor, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, to review plans for defense cooperation and, in turn, was warmed by Najjar’s assurance that Iran stands “ready to provide” any assistance necessary to “develop Azerbaijan’s military.” The expansion of relations with Iran is only one part of a broader strategy, however. Azerbaijan is also looking increasingly away from the West and has deepened its ties with Russia, Pakistan, and the Central Asian states. The underlying driver of this Azerbaijani strategy is a new assertive bid to achieve regional dominance — a bid launched not under Turkish tutelage, but from a new position of strength that rests on three factors. First, the promise of an imminent influx of oil wealth that will fuel a consolidation of state power and fund a military revival. That hoped-for consolidation is seen as the answer to the country’s social weakness and internal division. The second element of this bid for regional power stems from Azerbaijan’s linkage to Central Asia, specifically, the agreement (scheduled for signing later this month) under which Kazakhstan will commit to exporting 25 million tons of oil annually via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the possibility of building a new Caspian pipeline from Kazakhstan to link up with the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline. A related factor here is the benefit to Azerbaijan of being the center of gravity for Caspian Sea security, exploiting U.S. military assistance to dominate its rivals. Thirdly, Azerbaijan is further seeking to combine the first two elements in order to preposition itself for a future revolution in Iran and for a possible withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The prerequisite here is an effective and rebuilt Azerbaijani military that would be capable not merely of confronting Armenia, but of boosting a future Azerbaijani role as a regional power. There is, however, a crucial difference between seeking and securing a position of regional dominance. And Azerbaijan’s strategy for regional power is lacking in one essential aspect: it fails to address or solve Azerbaijan’s most fundamental impediment to state power — a lack of legitimacy. Thus, even if Azerbaijan succeeds in exploiting each of those opportunities, it will still remain hostage to the internal constraints inherent in a dynastic regime that has still to hold its first free and fair election. The lesson here is of the centrality of legitimacy as the foundation for true state power.
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC